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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
VAUGHN L. WARR, et al, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
THE \~AN KLEECK-BACON INVEST-
MENT COMPANY, and THE VAN 
KLEECK MORTGAGE COMPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
JAY LARSEN, . 
Appellant Oll'ltd Intervener. 
Case No. 7872 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
AND 
JAY LARSEN, APPELLANT AND INTERVENER 
PRELIMINARY 'STATEMENT 
This is an appeal by the Van Kleeck Companies, De-
fendants and Appellants, and by Jay Larsen, Ap.pellant 
and Intervener, from orders entered in the Fourth Judi-
cial District Court, Uintah County, the Honorable R. L. 
Tuckett, Judge, presiding, refusing to set aside a default 
and default judgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs 
against the defendants and refusing to allow Jay Larsen 
to intervene in the action. 
The action, a suit to have a deed absolute declared 
a mortgage and removed as a. cloud on plaintiffs' title, was 
instituted by the service of a summons on Don Barr, 
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2 
defendants' process agent in Utah, on July 31, 1951 (R. 
4). 21 days after service of summons, on August 21, 1951, 
defendants' default was entered by plaintiffs (R. 38). Ten 
days thereafter or 31 days after service of Summons, on 
August 31, 1951, a default judgment was entered against 
defendants (R. 5-6). 
Upon learning that a default judgment had been 
taken against them, defendants took prompt and immedi-
ate measures to have the default and default judgment 
set aside (R. 9-17). After strenuous and diligent efforts 
in ascertaining the facts, retaining Utah counsel and pre-
paring the necessary papers, defendants by motion dated 
November 19, 1951, and filed on November 20, 1951, 
moved the Court to set aside the entry of default and to 
vacate the default judgment and to permit the defendants 
to file their answer in the action (R. 9). The motion was 
made on the ground that the default and default judgment 
had been taken by reason of defendants' mistake, inadver-
tence, surprise or excusable neglect, and was based upon 
the affidavit of merits of defendants, the Notice of Mo-
tion, Affidavits of Ross Bray, Charles A. Baer and Don 
Barr attached to the motion, the Answer of defendants 
served therewith and all other records in the action (R. 
7-9). The motion thus filed on November 20, 1951 was 
one day less than three months from the date of entry of 
defendants' default in the action. In defendants' answer 
attached to the motion, the Court's attention was directed 
to the fact that, except for the mineral rights, the land and 
water stock involved in the action had in 1942 been con-
veyed by Warranty Deed to Jay Larsen (R.19) by virtue 
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of a contract to purchase the property dated ~larch 3, 
1938 (R. 20-21), and asserted as a defense to the action 
that Jay Larsen as such fee owner and in possession had 
not been joined by plaintiffs as a necessary and indispens-
able party defendant to the action (R. 22). 
The above motion of defendants was heard by the 
Court on December 14, 1951 and taken under advisement 
(R. 54). By a ruling dated at Provo, Utah, April26, 1952, 
and filed ~lay 13, 1952, the Court denied defendants' mo-
tion to set aside the judgment and found that defendants 
had failed to show that their failure to answer was due to 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect (R. 
31). 
Thereafter, three additional motions were filed in the 
action. On ~iay 23, 1952, defendants filed a supplemental 
motion to set aside the entry of default and to vacate the 
default judgment and to dismiss the action, or in lieu 
thereof to permit the defendants to file their answer in 
the action, upon the grounds that Jay Larsen, defendants' 
grantee of the surface rights and water stock, and c·arter 
Oil Company, defendants' lessee of the oil, gas and min-
eral rights, were necessary and indispensable parties 
defendant to the action and that such deed and lease were 
of record and in the abstract and personally known to 
plaintiffs prior to the commencement of the action (R. 32-
37). 
On May 23, 1952, Jay Larsen filed a motion to have 
the Court set aside the default judgment entered against 
defendants and for leave to intervene in the action as a 
party defendant and for leave to file his answer in the 
action upon the grounds that, except for the mineral 
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rights, he was the fee owner of the land and water stock 
involved in the action, holding under Warranty Deed 
from the defendants which deed had been recorded on 
October 29, 1942, in Book No. 33, Page No. 300, Uintah 
County records; that he had not learned of the action nor 
of the default judgment until May, 1952; that the Court's 
decree vesting title of the land and water stock in plain-
tiffs in effect constituted the assertion by plaintiffs of an 
adverse interest against him as the lawful owner in pos-
session of the property, except the mineral rights, and 
that the default judgment was void in its entirety in that 
he, an indispensable party to the action, had never been 
given any opportunity or notice to appear and be joined 
in the action (R. 39-41). 
By motion dated May 24, 1952 and filed on May 26, 
1952 defendants moved the Court to reconsider its ruling 
dated April 26, 1952, and filed on May 13, 1952, denying 
defendants' motion to set aside the default and default 
judgment, on the basis of the facts contained in the addi-
tional affidavits of H. M. Snyder, Sheriff of Uintah 
County, Don Barr, Cashier of the Bank of Vernal, and 
N.J. Meagher, President of the Bank of Vernal, attached 
to the motion (R. 44-48). 
The three motions described above were heard by the 
Court on June 11, 1952 at Provo, Utah, and the matter 
taken under advisement (R. 56). By ruling dated July 
12, 1952, and filed on July 16, 1952, the Court denied de-
fendants' motion to have the Court reconsider its prior 
ruling and, in view of the plaintiffs' offer in open court 
to tender Jay Larsen a quit claim deed to the surface 
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rights of the land involved, also denied the Inotion of 
Jay Larsen to set aside the default judgment and to inter-
vene in the suit (R. 55). The above offer of a quit claim 
deed by plaintiffs \Yas rejected by counsel in open Court 
on behalf of Jay Larsen. Jay Larsen continues in his re-
fusal to accept such deed and insists upon his right to 
intervene in the action and have the default judgment 
set aside so that the Court upon a trial of the merits can 
sever the mineral rights from the surface rights and 
water stock and either upon proof or by plaintiffs' dis-
claimer, confirm and recognize his ownership and right 
to possession of such surface rights and water stock under 
and by virtue of his Warranty Deed from defendants. 
Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal on June 12, 
1952, from the Court's order entered on May 13, 1952, 
denying defendants' motion of November 20, 1951. 
On August 12, 1952, the defendants and Jay Larsen 
together filed a Notice of Appeal from the Court's order 
entered on July 16, 1952, denying defendants' supplement-
al motions and the motion of Jay Larsen to set aside the 
judgment and to intervene in the action. 
By stipulation between the parties and Jay Larsen, 
approved by order signed by Mr. Justice McDonough of 
this Court, both Notices of Appeal are in effect consoli-
dated together as one case on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF. F'ACTS 
The Colorado National Bank, Denver, Colorado, is 
testamentary trustee of the Van Kleeck Estate and in 
this capacity represents the controlling interest of the de-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
fendant VanKleeck Companies (R. 16). Charles A. Baer, 
Assistant Trust Officer of the Bank, is an officer of both 
companies (R. 14). Both companies were organized under 
the laws of Colorado (R. 14). Ross Bray, an associate 
for many years of the late Mr. Van Kleeck, is likewise 
an officer of both companies (R. 10). 
Over 30 years ago, namely, by Warranty Deed ac-
knowledged May 14, 1921, and recorded on May 24, 1921, 
in Book No. 23, Page Nos. 102-3, Uintah County records, 
the defendant Van Kleeck-Bacon Investment Company 
acquired title from the father and mother of plaintiffs 
to the following described land and water stock located 
in Uintah County: 
Lots One and Two, and the East half of the North-
west quarter of Section 19, Township 1 South of 
Range One East of the Uintah Special Meridian, 
containing 160.84 acres, more or less; 
160 shares of the capital stock of the Big Six Irri-
gation Company. (R. 19). 
A photostatic copy of this deed appears in the record 
(R. 24-5). The deed on its face states: "This deed is not 
intended as a mortgage" (R. 24). This Warranty Deed 
was given in lieu of foreclosure proceedings and in ex-
tinguishment of a debt in the face amount· of $3,500.00, 
represented by a note dated April 22, 1920, in the amount 
of $2,500.00 and a note dated April 23, 1920 in the amount 
of $1,000.00 signed by Joseph F. W arr and Elizabeth 
Warr, father and mother of plaintiffs, payable and ef-
fected in Denver, Colorado, in favor of the defendant, 
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\''"an Kleeck ~lortgage Company (R. 30). No part of 
either principal or interest on such indebtedness was ever 
paid by the W arrs to either of the defendant companies 
(R. 30). The notes were secured by two mortgages on 
the above land and water stock, aggregating $3,500.00, 
and the conveyance from plaintiff's father and mother to 
the defendant, \Tan Kleeck-Bacon Investment Company, 
'vas made subject to such mortgages (R. 24). The mort-
gages and debt were released of record several years 
later in 1938 at the time Jay Larsen contracted to pur-
chase the surface rights and water stock from the defend-
ant companies. 
At the time the aforesaid Warranty Deed was ex-
ecuted and delivered to the defendant, Van Kleeck-Bacon 
Investment Company, by plaintiffs' father and mother, 
the parties entered into an option and agreement under 
which the defendant company agreed to reconvey the 
property upon the payment before November 1, 1921 of 
all arrears, taxes, water assessments and expenses (R. 
30). The Warrs did not exercise their option, paid no 
money under the contract, and finally vacated and moved 
off the property on December 20, 1922 (R. 21 and R. 30). 
No member of the W arr family was ever heard from 
again until November 7, 1951, when the defendant com-
panies were shocked to hear of the suit and thereafter 
learn that a default judgment had been entered in this 
case in favor of the W arr children (R. 30). 
After the W arr family vacated and moved off the 
premises on December 20, 1922, the defendant company 
took possession, leasing the land to various tenants and 
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paying all water assessments and taxes continuously on 
the land from year to year thereafter until 1938 (R. 18-
23). 
On March 3, 1938 Jay Larsen contracted to purchase 
the land and water stock, excepting the mineral rights, 
for the sum of $1,000.00, payable in installments (R. 33, 
R. 30). Larsen entered into possession at the time of 
such contract and has paid all taxes and water assess-
ments on the property since that time (R. 33-34). Upon 
final payment of the agreed purchase price and on Feb-
ruary 4, 1942, the defendant by Warranty Deed recorded 
on October 29, 1942, in Book No. 33, Page No. 300, Uintah 
County Records, conveyed the land and water stock, ex-
cepting the mineral rights, to Jay Larsen in fee (R. 39-
40). Jay Larsen has used the land as irrigated pasture 
in his cattle and farming operations (R. 33-4). 
On March 15, 1951, the defendant companies signed 
and executed an oil and gas lease with Carter Oil .Com-
pany covering the land in question which lease was there-
after recorded and of record prior to the commencement 
of the present action on July 31, 1951 (R. 35). The lease 
contains a Warranty of Title by the defendant companies 
to the Carter Oil Company (R. 36). Carter Oil Company 
assigned the lease to ·stanolind Oil & Gas Company which 
Company in turn assigned the lease to Phillips Petrol-
eum Company (R. 35). The aforesaid assignments were 
of record prior to the commencement of the present action 
on July 31, 1951 ( R. 35). On June 23, 1951, plain tiffs ex-
ecuted a document with Carter Oil Company ratifying 
defendants' oil and gas lease with the same force and 
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effect as if plaintiffs had been na1ned as Lessors therein 
(R. 35). No notice of such ratification or assertion of ad-
verse interest in the property by plaintiffs was given to 
defendant con1panies, either by plaintiffs or by Carter 
Oil Company or by anyone else (R. 35). It is admitted 
that Carter Oil Company paid a bonus of $75,000.00 to the 
defendant companies for executing the aforesaid oil and 
gas lease. 
Immediately prior to the execution of the Carter 
oil and gas lease on March 15, 1951, it became necessary 
because of deaths of former agents to appoint a new 
process agent for defendant companies in Utah (R. 30). 
At the suggestion of the Colorado National Bank, 
the defendant companies selected and appointed as their 
process agent in the State of Utah, Don Barr, Cashier of 
the Bank of Vernal. The Bank of Vernal was the cor-
respondent bank in Vernal, Utah, of the Colorado Na-
tional Bank (R. 30-Baer deposition). He was carefully 
selected after discussions with various officers of the 
Colorado bank because he was situated in Vern,al, was 
cashier of the bank and was a young man (R. 30). Don 
Barr, early in March, 1951, accepted the appointment as 
process agent in Utah for the defendant companies (R. 
26-29, R. 53, R. 46). He was given no specific instructions 
concerning his duties as process agent, nor was there any 
need to give any such instructions, for he clearly under-
stood that his only duty was to forward to the offices of 
the defendant companies in Denver, Colorado, any papers 
served on him pertaining to the Van Kleeck Companies 
(R. 46, 26-29). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
On July 31, 1951, sometime during the working day, 
H. M. Snyder, Sheriff of Uintah County, walked into the 
Bank of Vernal for the purpose of serving the summons 
and complaint in this action on Don Barr, the defendants' 
process agent in Utah (R. 45). At the time Barr was work-
ing behind the second teller's window on the left as you go 
in the main entrance of the bank (R. 45). The Sheriff 
walked up to the window and speaking through the cage 
said he had some papers for him (R. 45). Barr asked 
what they were and the Sheriff gave the papers to him 
indorsing the service on them at the time (R. 45). Accord-
ing to the Sheriff's clear recollection, Don Barr handed 
the papers back and said "These papers are not for me"; 
"There must be some mistake, these papers are for 
Vaughn Warr, not Don Barr." (R. 45). The Sheriff 
pushed the papers back and said he was going to leave 
them nevertheless (R.45). 
Sheriff Snyder, in his affidavit (R. 45) stated: 
"I have a clear recollection of the incident and 
there is no doubt in my mind whatsoever that Don 
Barr made an honest mistake in misapprehending 
the import of the papers being served upon him be-
cause of the close similarity between the name 
Vaughn W arr and his own name, Don Barr." (R. 
45). 
Mr. N. J. Meagher, President of the Bank of Vernal, 
was in the Bank on the day the Sheriff came in. After the 
Sheriff left he walked over and said to Mr. Barr: "Don, 
what were those papers the Sheriff brought in~" Mr. 
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Barr replied: '~There w·as son1e mistake. The papers did 
not pertain to me or the Bank. They 'vere for a man by 
the nan1e of Warr." (R. -!7). Thir. Meagher likewise af-
firmed that :\Ir. Barr as Cashier had always discharged 
his duties in a highly conscientous, careful, prudent and 
competent manner (R. -!7). 
Don Barr himself affinns that but for his mistake in 
apprehending that the papers in the action were intended 
for ,~aughn "\"\Tarr rather than himself, by reason solely 
of the similarity in the two names, and if he had noticed 
or had his attention called to the Van Kleeck names, it 
would have immediately recalled to mind his appointment, 
approximately four and one-half months earlier, as 
process agent for the Van Kleeck companies and he would 
have immediately forwarded such papers to the Compan-
ies in Denver, Colorado (R. 46). At the time of service 
he did not remember or have his appointment sp·ecifically 
in mind (R. 53) but the fact of such appointment would 
have been immediately recalled to mind if he had seen, 
or had his attention called to the Van Kleeck name and if 
he had not made the honest mistake of thinking that the 
papers were meant for Vaughn Warr instead of Don 
Barr (R. 46). Whatever happened to the papers no-
body knows; they did not turn up· at the bank or elsewhere 
(R. 26-29). 
21 days after the service as aforesaid, plaintiffs 
entered defendants' default (R. 38). Ten days later, upon 
the sole testimony of plaintiffs' counsel, the Court 
found that the Warranty Deed from plaintiffs' father and 
mother under which both defendants, as grantee, and 
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Jay Larsen, as defendants' grantee, claim their respective 
interests, was not a deed but an unforeclosed mortgage, 
outlawed by the Statutes of Limitation of Utah (R. 5-6). 
By the judgment, the Court decreed: 
"1. That the plaintiffs are the owners and en-
titled to the possession of the following described 
realty and water stock in Uintah County, State 
of Utah, to-wit: 
Lots One and Two and the East half of the 
Northwest quarter of S.ection 19, Township 
1 South, of Range 1 East, of the Uintah Spe-
cial Meridian ; and all petroleum and mineral 
rights therein ; and 
160 shares of the capital stock of the Big Six 
Irrigation Company." (R. 5). 
By paragraph 5 of the judgment, plaintiffs were 
awarded their costs of Court (R. 6). The Court likewise 
found that the mortgage and conveyance were void be-
cause the defendants were non-qualified Colorado cor-
porations doing business in Utah (R. 5-6). This was not 
the fact (R. 18-23). 
Plaintiffs in their complaint, although alleging that 
the deed was a mortgage whose foreclosure was outlawed 
by the statute of limitations, made no offer to pay any 
sum against the unpaid mortgage debt or interest. They 
made no offer to pay any of the taxes or water assess-
ments which have been paid on the property for 30 years. 
They made no offer to pay for any improvements on the 
property (R. 2-3). In their complaint, plaintiffs did not 
ask the Court to decree that they were the owners and 
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entitled to the possession of the n1ineral rights only; 
they alleged in paragraph 4 of their con1plaint that they 
'vere the owners and entitled to the possession of the en-
tire interest in the 160.84 acres, as described, and 160 
shares of the capital stock of the Big 'Six Irrigation Com-
pany (R. 2). In their prayer, they asked: 
~-1. That the plaintiffs be declared to he the 
O"\v""D.ers of the above described realty and water 
stock;" (R. 3). 
The default judgment conformed with this prayer 
for relief and vested complete ·and entire ownership in the 
realty and water stock in plaintiffs (R. 5). The cause of 
action was single and indivisible; the judgment was single 
and indivisible (R. 3-5). 
Both at the time of the commencement of the action 
on July 31, 1951, and on August 31, 1951, when the hear-
ing was held and the default judgment entered by the 
Court, plaintiffs knew both personally and from the ab-
stract of title introduced in evidence, that Jay Larsen 
was the record owner and in p·ossession of the land, ex-
cepting the mineral rights, and the water stock as well. 
They also knew of defendants' lease to Carter Oil Com-
pany of the mineral rights, and of the assignments of such 
lease (R. 32-7, R. 39-41). Although Jay Larsen, Big Six 
Irrigation Company, Carter Oil Company, and its assign-
ees, were and are all available for service of process in 
this action, no effort was made to join them in the action 
notwithstanding their known interests in the property 
(R. 32-7). At no time from December 20, 1922, when the 
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Warr family actually vacated and moved off the premises, 
until November 7, 1951, when John Cook of the Carter 
Oil Company happened to advise Ross Bray in Denver of 
the suit (R. 11) did the plaintiffs or any member of the 
W arr family ever at any time assert any adverse interest 
or claim any interest whatsoever in the property against 
the defendant companies or against Jay Larsen, the de-
fendants' grantee of the surface rights and water stock 
(R. 30, 33, 40). 
The defendant companies, upon first being apprised 
of the suit on November 7, 1951, took immediate and vig-
orous steps to have the default and default judgment set 
aside (R. 10-17). Jay Larsen, on hearing of the suit for 
the first time in May, 1952, likewise took immediate steps 
to intervene in the action and protect his interest in the 
property under and by virtue of his Warranty Deed from 
defendants (R. 39-41). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Two primary questions are presented to this Court 
for determination. The first is whether the District 
Court erred in refusing to grant the timely motion of de-
fendants to set aside the default and default judgment 
by ruling that the" honest mistake of Don Barr was in-
excusable. The second question is whe.ther the default 
judgment should have been set aside by the District Court 
because necessary and indispensable parties to the action 
were not joined and were not permitted to join in the 
action. Although we respectfully suggest that the District 
Court's rulings should clearly be, reversed on both . 
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grounds 'Ye take up first for discussion the well-estab-
lished principle that the non-joinder of necessary and in-
dispensable parties requires a reversal of the District 
Court's rulings in the circumstances of this case. 
POINT I 
A DEFAULT JUDGMENT MUST BE SET ASIDE WHEN, 
BY TIMELY MOTION, THE FACT THAT A NECESSARY 
AND INDISPENSABLE PARTY HAS NOT BEEN JOINED 
IN THE ACTION IS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF 
THE COURT. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The present action instituted by plaintiffs is in the 
nature of an equitable action to cancel or set aside a deed 
absolute on the ground that the deed was in fact a mort-
gage \\~hose foreclosure by the n1ortgagee was outlawed 
by the provisions of Sections 104-2-6 and 104-2-22 of the 
Utah Statutes of Limitation and was void because the 
defendants were not at the time their interests were ac-
quired qualified to do business in Utah. Plaintiffs' cause 
of action sought to invalidate in its entirety the recorded 
warranty deed of their father and mother executed and 
delivered in 1921, over 30 years ago, which conveyed in 
fee simple 160.84 acres of land located in Uintah County 
and 160 shares of the capital stock of the Big Six Irriga-
tion Company. These allegations were made notwith-
standing that the deed on its face stated "This deed is not 
intended as a mortgage" and notwithstanding that the 
deed was executed and delivered not to secure but to ex-
tinguish the mortgage indebtedness in lieu of foreclosure 
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proceedings. The deed itself was made subject to the two 
earlier mortgages executed by plaintiffs' father and 
mother and these mortgages were later released of record 
in 1938. 
Plaintiffs, even on their theory that the deed was a 
1nortgage, made no offer to pay any part of the mortgage 
debt or interest thereon and made no offer to pay up any 
part of the 30 years of back taxes and water assessments 
which have been paid by defendants and Jay Larsen, nor 
did they offer to pay for any of the improvements which 
have now made the land extremely valuable for its use 
alone as irrigated pasture. 
Plaintiffs alleged and the Court decreed that the deed 
in its entirety was "only of the nature of a mortgage" 
and as such void and outlawed. By judgment of the Court 
the en tire fee ownership of the 160.84 acres of the de-
scribed realty and 160 shares of the capital stock of the 
Big 'Six Irrigation Company was vested in plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs' cause of action did not sever the mineral rights 
from the land and water stock, nor did the Court's judg-
ment. 
Plaintiffs knew when they filed the action on July 31, 
1951 and their counsel knew 30 days later when he testi-
fied in the action and the Court signed the default judg-
ment, that Jay Larsen was in possession and the record 
fee owner of the described land and water stock, excepting 
the mineral rights, and they likewise knew that defend-
ants had previously divested themselves by lease to the 
Carter Oil Company of the oil, gas and mineral rights. 
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Notwithstanding that the deed to Jay Larsen and 
the lease to Carter Oil Company were both known to 
plaintiffs, they n1ade no effort to join either in the action. 
In fact, a fe"" days before instituting the action against 
defendants, plaintiffs attempted to get Carter Oil Com-
pany out of the picture by adopting and ratifying defend-
ants~ oil and gas lease with that Company. This mane-
uver, unknown to defendants, eliminated the possibility 
of Carter Oil Company's insisting on intervening in the 
action to uphold its oil and gas lease from defendants. It 
also left Carter Oil Company in the position where, unless 
the Court requires it to be joined, it can now sit back 
in a neutral position and attempt to recover the $75,000.-
00 paid to defendants if the present default judgment 
is allowed to stand. 
Jay Larsen, as defendants' grantee of the surface 
rights and water stock, however, was not eliminated 
from the picture by plaintiffs prior to the commencement 
of the action. Although known to be the fee owner of 
record of the surface rights and water stock he was not 
joined as a party to the action. He holds 160.84 acres 
of irrigated pasture and the 160 shares of stock in the Big 
Six Irrigation Company under warranty deed from a 
grantee whose deed by default judgment in this action 
has in its entirety been declared null and void. His chain 
of title, with one link out, has been rendered unmerchant-
able by the Courts' judgment. A quit claim deed from 
these plaintiffs, he thinks, is a poor substitute for a court 
decree. He insists upon his right not in an independent 
action, but in this action, to have the Court's judgment 
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set aside and modified to recognize his fee ownership in 
the surface and water stock. He does not think that the 
Court should cloud his title by formal judgment and then 
without permitting him to be a party to the action at-
ternpt to force him to accept a quit claim deed from these 
plain tiffs. 
The truth of this case is somewhat about as follows: 
The W arr children somehow or other got wind that this 
tract of land which their father and mother had deeded 
away 30 years ago was now one of the most valuable 
tracts of oil land in the Roosevelt Pool. Without having 
asserted any claim whatsoever against the property for 
30 years they took the blind chance of acquiring some 
interest by filing suit. By a peculiar, if not incredible, 
series of circumstances default judgment resulted in their 
favor. Fortunately for defendants Don Barr is not the 
only one who made a mistake in this action. Plaintiffs 
made the mistake of not joining Jay Larsen as a party 
defendant as the authorities hereafter cited clearly 
demonstrate. 
WHO ARE PROPER, NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE 
PARTIES 
The new Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, expressing 
old law, classify parties into p,roper, necessary and indis-
pensable parties. Both in the Federal Courts and in this 
State: 
(a) Proper parties are those who may be 
joined in the action at the discretion of plaintiff. 
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(b) Necessary parties are those who should 
be present and joined in the action and without 
'vhon1 the Court n1a-y not proceed except where 
··jurisdiction over them can be acquired only by 
their consent or vollmtary appearace." 
(c) Ind-ispensable parties are those who 
must be present and joined in the action. 
See: 65 Harvard La\v Review at page 1050; Wash-
ington v. United States, 87 F'. (2d) 421, (CCA9) (1936): 
"The absence of an 'indispensable' party is 
fatal to the maintenance of a suit. The Court nor-
mally will dismiss even where it is impossible to 
bring the absent person before the Court, or where 
his joinder would destroy jurisdiction. Thus the 
requirement of joining indispensable parties may 
not only permanently deprive the plaintiff of a 
federal forum, but also prevent recovery in any 
court." 65 H.L.R. 1050. 
Under Rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proced-
ure, it is provided that "persons having a joint interest 
shall be made parties and be joined on the same side as 
plaintiffs or defendants." This rule is, of course, subject 
to the provision of Rule 23 relating to "class actions" 
which has no applicability to the present situation. 
Furthermore, Rule 19 (b) reads as follows: 
"(b) Effect of Failure to Join. When pe.r-
sons who are not indispensable, but who ought to 
be parties if complete relief is to be accorded be-
tween those already parties, have not been made 
parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
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Court as to service of process, the court shall 
order them summoned to appear in the action. 
The Court in its discretion may proceed in the 
action without making such persons parties, if its 
jurisdiction over them can be acquired only by 
their consent or voluntary appearance; but the 
judgment rendered therein does not affect the 
rights or liabilities of absent persons." (Italics 
supplied.) 
Subsection (c) of Rule 19 likewise provides : 
" (c) Same: Names of Omitted Persons and 
Reasons for Non-Joinder to be Pleaded: In any 
pleading in which relief is asked, the pleader shall 
set forth the names, if known to him, or persons 
who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be 
accorded between those already parties, but who 
are not joined, and shall state why they are omit-
ted." 
Again, Rule 21,' entitled "1\tlisjoinder and Non-
Joinder of Parties" provides in part: 
"Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dis-
missal of an action. Parties may be dropped or 
added by order of the Court on motion of any 
party or of its own initiative at any stage of the 
action and on such terms as are just." 
The above Utah Rules were taken from the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and show clearly that there can 
be no dispensing with indispensable parties as the follow-
ing commenta.ry shows. The commentary is taken from 
Vol. 6 of the Cyclopedia of F·ederal Procedure, 2nd Edi-
tion: 
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~·It has been said the Rule 19 attempts to give 
some definitions to the distinction between indis~ 
pensable parties and necessary parties, and that 
the distinction between 'necessary' and 'in dis pen ... 
sable' parties is recognized in Rule 19 (b) of the 
new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is ob"'7 
vious, however, that the rule does not purport to 
define the distinctions." (Citing cases.) 
Para. 2136 states:·~ 
'. 
"The fundamental importance of . indispen-
sable parties from a procedural standpoint is re-
flected in the well-settled general rule, necessarily 
as true since the advent ~f the. F·ederal Rules of 
Civil Procedure as before, that where an indis.:. 
pensable party is absent the court may not grant 
any relief. Consequently, in the absence of indis-
pensable parties dismissal of the suit is proper." 
( Citllig cases.) 
It is therefore clearly established law that ~he ab-
sence 9f an indispensable party is fatal to the ~ainten,­
ance of a suit and when brought to the attention of the 
. 
Court requires either a complete dismissal of the suit 
and the vacation of any judgment rendered therein or the 
indispensable party must be joined so that the court 
may proceed with the action. 
"The rules of indisp·ensability have been for-
mulated largely to protect an absent interested 
person or the defendant. The defendant may pro-
tect in his ·own interest; even where he cannot 
object in his qwn right, he. may rely on the in-
terest of the absent person." (65 HLR 1050). 
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The only exception to this rule is where the person to 
be protected, by his own inequitable conduct, is precluded 
from raising the objection. Examples of this are where 
the defendant and the absentee conspire to suppress the· 
fact of indispensability from the Court or where the 
defendant had sworn that certain persons had no inter-
est he could not thereafter raise the issue of their indis-
pensability. This exception obviously had no application 
to the present situation. 
The test for determining indispensability is still 
that laid down in Shields v. Barrow in 1855, 17 How. 130, 
by the United States Supre·me Court, where it was stated 
that indispensable parties are 
"Persons who not only have an interest in the 
controversy, but an interest of such a nature that 
a final decree cannot be made without either af-
fecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in 
such a condition that its final termination may 
be wholly inconsistent with equity and good con-
science." 
In Houst.on Real Estate Investment Compa;n;y v. 
Hechler, 44 Utah 64 (1914) the Supreme Court of Utah 
st~ated as follows: (page 78) 
"In view of what has been said, we feel con-
strained to hold that, where A's property is at-
tached in an action by B against C, A, as a m~atteT 
of right, may intervene in B's action, and in that 
action have determined his right to or interest 
in the property." 
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ARE GRANTEES AND LESSEES OF RECORD PRIOR TO 
THE CO:\IMENCEI\'IENT OF AN ACTION NECESSARY AND 
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES? 
The authorities clearly establish that a defendant's 
vendee and lessee are necessary and indispensable partie~ 
to the action. 
\v~ith respect to the general principle involved, we 
refer first to the case of Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130 
(1855 ), 'vhich involved a situation where a vendor had 
sold certain plantations and slaves to a citizen of Louisi-. 
ana for $227,000. He received payments aggregating 
about $107,000. Some of the notes being unpaid, the ven-
dor instituted an action against the vendee. This action 
was settled by the vendor agreeing to take the property 
back upon the payment of an additional sum of money 
which was secured by the notes of six individuals, four of 
whom lived in Louisiana, and two in Mississippi. Becom-
ing dissatisfied with this arrangement the vendor insti-
tuted suit seeking to have this settlement agreement set 
aside and to have his rights under the original agree-
ment restored. The two Mississippi residents only were 
joined as defendants, the vendee and his four indorsers 
all from Louisiana not being joined. 
Mr. Justice Curtis stated; p-age 139 and 140: 
"The contract of compromise was .one entire 
subject, and from its nature could not be rescinded, 
so far as respected two of the parties to it, and 
allowed to stand as to the others. Thomas R. 
Shields, the principal, and four out of six of his 
indorsers, being citizens of Louisiana, could not be 
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made defendants in this suit; yet each of them was 
an indispensable party to a bill for the rescission 
of the contract. Neither the act of congress of 
February 28, 1839, (5 Stat. at Large, 321, par. 1) 
nor the 47th rule for the equity practice of the 
circuit courts of the United States, enables a cir-
cuit court to make a decree in equity, in the ab-
sence of an indispensable party, whose rights 
Inust necessarily be affected by such decree. * * *" 
''A bill to rescind a contract affords an ex-
ample of this kind. For, if only a part of those 
interested in the contract are before the court, a 
decree of rescission must either destroy the rights 
of those who are absent, or leave the contract in 
full force as respects them; while it is set aside, 
and the contracting parties restored to their for-
mer condition, as to the others. We do not say that 
no case can arise in which this may be done; but 
it must be a case in which the rights of those before 
the court are completely separable from the rights 
of those absent, otherwise the latter are indispen-
sable parties." 
In United States v. Central Pacific R. Co., 11 Fed. 
449 (1882) the United States brought a suit against the 
railroad to vacate certain patents on the ground of mis-
take in the issuance of the patents to the railroad as a 
part of its land grant. The action was dismissed because 
the defendant's grantees were indispensable parties and 
had not been joined in the action. 
The court (per Sawyer, C.J.) stated: 
"* * * there is another point upon which the 
present bill must be dismissed, as to all the lands 
and patents in question. The Central Pacific Rail-
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road Company is the only defendant, and before 
the filing of the bill it had conveyed all the lands 
in question and ceased to have any interest in the 
subject-matter in controversy. Not a person who 
had any interest in the n1atter in controversy 
when the bill was filed has been made a party to 
this suit. The court is asked to vacate patents to 
large quantities of land held by numerous parties 
under these patents without anybody having an in-
terest in the lands being a party to the suit. The 
parties in interest are not only proper but indis-
pensable parties. No decree can be rendered an-
nulling or affecting the title of parties to land 
without their presence. They are entitled to their 
day in court. Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130; 
Coiron v. Millandon, 19 How. 113; Barney v. Balti-
more City, 6 Wall. 285; Rib on v. Railroad Co., 
16 Wall 450 ; Railroad Co. v. Orr, 18 Wall. 4 7 5. The 
defendant in this suit, having no interest in the 
subject-matter involved, is not even a necessary, 
if a proper, party to the bill to annul the P'a tents. 
To vacate the patents on this bill would be very 
much like foreclosing a mortgage upon lands, in a 
suit against a mortgagor not person,ally liable for 
the debt secured, after he has conveyed the mort-
gaged lands, without making the owner of the 
lands a party. All the indispensable parties are 
omitted from the bill, and those not necessary to 
be made parties are sued." 
In New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U.S. 52 (1917), the State 
of New Mexico brought a suit against the Secretary of the 
Interior and the Commissioner of the General Land Office 
asking that a tract of land which the Interior Department 
had awarded ·and sold as coal land to an entryman under 
the coal land law be decreed to be the property of the 
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State under the school-land grant and that the issuance 
of a patent to the entryman be enjoined. 
The Supreme Court of the United ·states dismissed 
the suit on grounds which included the fact that the entry-
man, having vurchased the land and paid the price was 
an indispensable party to the granting of the relief 
prayed. 
Mr. Justice McKenna stated, p. 58: 
"It would seem, besides, that under the aver-
ments of the bill Keepers is an indispensable 
party, he having become, according to the bill, 
a purchaser of the land and paid the purchase 
price thereof." 
In South Penn Oil Co. v. Miller, 175 F'ed. 729 (1909) 
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held 
that a court cannot adjudicate rights unde-r conflicting 
oil leases of the same property, executed by different les-
so-rs, and each providing for the payment of royalties, 
in a suit between the lessees to which the lessors are not 
parties. The Court, speaking through Judge Goff, stated: 
"We also think the record discloses the fact 
that parties absolutely essential to the proper dis-
position of the questions decided by the court be-
low were not before it, and that consequently, even 
had the subject-matter of the controversy been 
properly within its jurisdiction, the court could 
not have· effectively disposed of it. Neither the 
lessors of the complainants, nor of the defendants, 
were made parties to the suit, and yet the final 
decree disposed of the funds in which they were 
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interested, and decided the title to the property 
'vhich they claim to own in fee simple. It takes 
fron1 the one and gives to the other set of claim-
ants portions of the land clain1ed, respe-ctively, by 
those not made parties. It adjudges that the com-
plaintants are the o"11ers, by virtue of their leases 
for oil and gas, of the real property in dispute that 
is located to the west of a certain line, although 
such property is claimed in fee simple by the les-
sors of the South Penn Oil Company, who were 
not permitted to defend their titles. The receiver 
is directed to turn over to the complainants the 
oil \veils on the land so situated west of that line, 
thereby giving to complainants' lessors the royal-
ty due from said wells, which is also claimed by the 
lessors of the defendant the South Penn Oil Com-
pany. And, again, the South Penn Oil Company is 
adjudged to be the owner of the wells found to be 
on the east side of said line, on land the title to 
which is claimed by the lessors of complainants, 
who are thereby deprived of the royalties due 
from the wells so given to the South Penn Oil 
Company. Clearly, these lessors are not deprived 
of their rights, or bound by said decre-e; nor are 
they estopped by it from litigating to protect their 
interests. Evidently the. decree of the court be-
low could not finally and effectually dispose of 
the controversy, as the lessors referred to were 
indispensable parties, and those claiming under it 
would hold defective titles." 
In United States v. Bean, 253 F'ed. 1 (1918), the 
United States brought a suit against G. E. Bean, County 
Treasurer of Seminole County, Oklahoma, to enjoin and 
prevent the County Treasurer from selling and conveying 
certain lands for delinquent taxes which had been allotted 
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and formerly owned by the Seminole Nation or Tribe of 
Indians. The government contended that under the Fed-
eral laws these lands were inalienable save on approval 
of the· court. The Circuit Court of Appeals speaking 
through Judge 'Sanborn dismissed the action upon the 
ground that the purchasers of the lands from the County 
Treasurer were indispensable and had not been joined 
as parties to the action. 
"From the complaint and the decree the facts 
conclusively appear that this suit has been com-
menced, prosecuted, and a decree has been render-
ed against the party who has no real interest in 
the property in litigation, and that none of the· real 
parties in interest adverse to the claim of the com-
plainant have been made parties to the suit, or 
have appeared or been heard therein. The taxes 
of which complaint is made have been levied, 
the lands upon which they were levied have been 
sold to pay them, certificates of the sales thereof 
have been executed and delivered, the· certificates 
and any liens they evidence are held either by the 
county, or by other purchasers at the sales, or 
from the county, or by their successors in interest; 
but neitheT the county (Revised Laws Oklahoma, 
sec. 1501), nor any of the purchasers at the sales, 
nor any of the holders of the certificates of sales, 
are parties to this suit, and as they have not been 
made parties, and have not been heard, or had any 
op·portunity to be heard in this suit, nothing that 
the court below has adjudged and nothing that this 
court has decided herein is or can be binding upon 
them, or upon any parties claiming under them, or 
even upon the court below, or upon this court, 
when, if ever, the claims, rights, and interests of. 
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these parties who are not present in either of the 
courts are presented by them for adjudication. 
"But the decree, by its terms, annuls their 
certificates, destroys the liens they claim, removes 
all these as clouds upon the titles, without any 
notice to or hearing by them, and this decree 
doubtless has been, or, if permitted to stand, will 
be, spread upon the records of the titles to these 
lands. It cannot fail injuriously to affect-nay, 
practically to destroy-the value of the claims and 
rights of these holders of certificates, because it 
bears on its face no adequate notice that they are 
not bound by it. 'The established practice of 
courts of equity to dismiss the plaintiff's bill,' says 
the Supreme Court, in Minnesota v. Northern 
Securities Co., 184 U. S. 199, 235, 22 Sup. Ct. 308, 
322 ( 46 L. Ed. 499), 'if it appears that to grant the 
relief prayed for would injuriously affect persons 
materially interested in the subject-matter who are 
not made parties to the suit, is founded upon clear 
reasons, and may be enforced by the court sua 
sponte, though not raised by the pleadings or sug-
gested by counsel. Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130 
(15 L. Ed. 158) Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 271, 278 
(15 L. Ed. 633); Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake 
Cotton & Woolen Co., 2 Black, 545 ( 17 L. Ed. 333)' 
To the same effect is the opinion of this court in 
Hawes v. First Nat. Bank, 229 Fed. 51, 57, 59, 
143 C. C. A. 645, 651, 653. 
"It is a familiar and just rule that no court 
may directly adjudicate a person's claim of right, 
unless he is actually or constructively before it. 
It is an established rule of practice in the conduct 
of suits in equity in the federal courts that every 
indispensable party must be brought into the court 
or the suit must be dismissed. And an indispens-
able party is one who has such an interest in the 
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subject-matter of the controversy that a final de-
cree cannot be made without affecting his inter-
ests, or leaving the controversy in such a situation 
that its final determination may be inconsistent 
with equity and good conscience. Seminole County 
and each of the other holders of certificates of sale 
or of liens which they claim upon any of the lands 
described in the complaint which the plaintiff seeks 
to affect by this decree, was an indispensable party 
to this or any suit to avoid or injuriously affect 
his certificate or claimed lien. And as Justice 
Curtis said in Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 
How.) 130 138, at 141 (15 L. Ed. 158): 
'It being clear that the Circuit Court 
could make no decree, as between the parties 
originally before it, so as to do complete and 
final justice between them without affecting 
the rights of absent persons,' the original bill 
ought to have been dismissed." 
In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Hofstater, 32 Fed. (2) 
184 (1929), the Circuit Court of Appeals, 'Second Circuit, 
held that the doctrine of the vendee's indispensability 
to an action, however, should not be extended so far as to 
include a mere prospective purchaser. Judge Chase 
stated: 
"The trial court was right in denying the mo-
tion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Rabenold 
was not a vendee. What is said concerning a ven-
dee in New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U. S. 52-58, 37 S. 
Ct. 348, 61 L. Ed. 588, does not apply here. At 
most, Rabenold was only a prospective vendee, 
who was affected by this suit only in that its deci-
sion might influence his decision to buy or not to 
buy." 
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In 1lliller v. J{lasn.e·r. 1-±0 Pac. 1107 (191-t ), the 'Su-
preme Court of Ne\Y nlexico had under consideration a 
case aln1ost on all fours \Yi th the one at bar. 
The appellee had instituted a suit to enjoin appellant 
fron1 interfering \Yith his right to the use of a stated 
an1ount of 'vater of an irrigation ditch. The appellant 
ans\Yered and filed a cross-complaint. A referee was ap-
pointed by the court to take testimony. The referee 
served a written notice of the time and place of hearing. 
Geo. W. Prichard, Esq. of Santa Fe, appellant's attorney 
on receiving this notice advised the referee he could not 
attend and also stated he would advise his client so she 
could make other arrangements. The referee thereupon 
sent a notice by registered mail to appellant but this letter 
was missent to Roswell by the postal authorities and 
was not received by appellant until sometime after the 
hearing. She heard nothing from her attorney. 
The referee took testimony and the court upon mo_tion 
and without notice to appellant considered the referee's 
report and rendered judgment thereon awarding appellee 
two-thirds of the ditch and a one-third interest to Ellen 
Casey, who was not a party to the suit, but who appeared 
to be the mother of appellant. From the record it ap-
peared that the appellant was either the~ agent of her 
mother, Ellen Casey, or was a tenant in common with her 
mother and otheTs to the lands involved. 
After the above judgment was rendered, the appel-
lant for various reasons moved to have the same set 
aside and vacated. The motion was denied and the cause 
appealed. 
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The Supreme Court of New Mexico stated: 
"Appellant contends that the court should 
have vacated the decree, because she had no op-
portunity to defend her rights. Waiving this ques-
tion, however, the judgment in question should 
have been set aside, because it appears from the 
decree itself that Ellen Casey was a necessary and 
indispensable party to the action. It is a familiar 
and fundamental rule that a· court can make no 
decree affecting the rights of a person over whom 
it has not obtained jurisdiction, or between the 
parties before it, which so far involves or depends 
upon the rights of an absent person that complete 
and final justice ~annot be done between the par-
ties to the suit without affecting those rights. 
Shields et al. v. Barrow, 17 How. 130, 15 L. Ed. 
158. In this case appellee's right to the relief which 
he sought necessarily depends upon a determina-
tion of his right to the use of the ditch and water 
as against Ellen Casey, or the principals, repre-
sented by appellant. Until this right was deter-
mined the court could not rightfully enjoin appel-
lant from using the water, as the representative of 
these absent parties. The injunction was neces-
sarily predicated upon the prior determination of 
these rights. The interest of Ellen Casey was 
necessarily so interwoven with the interests of the 
parties to this suit that no decree could possibly 
be made, affecting the rights of those before the 
court, without operating upon her interest. Such 
being the case, she was an indispensable party, 
without whom the court could not lawfully pro-
ceed. C.S.M. Co. v. V. & G.H.W. Co., 1 Sawyer, 
685, F'ed. Cas. No. 2,990. When this fact was de-
veloped by the evidence, even though it had not 
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been raised by the pleadings, the court should have 
taken notice of the same and have directed that the 
cause stand oYer, in order that such party could 
be brought in. ~>\.s 'Yas said by the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court, in the case of Schwoerer v. Boyls-
ton ~larket _ .. A .. ssociation, 99 l\Iass. 285 : 'If there 
be an omission of an indispensable party, so that 
a complete decree cannot be n1ade without him, 
the court will itself, ex mero motu, take notice of 
the fact, and direct the cause to stand over, in 
order that such new party may be added.' 
~~2. ''Thile it is true, the general rule is that 
a defendant must take advantage of the defect 
of parties by demurrer or answer, failing in which 
the objection is waived, still this rule does not 
apply to an indispensable party, and where the 
court may not proceed to a decree or judgment 
without his presence. Peck v. Peck, 33 Colo. 421, 
80 Pac. 1063; Denison v. Jerome, 43 Colo. 456, 96 
Pac. 166. 
"3. The only remaining question then is 
whether the objection ·that there is the want of a 
necessary and indispensable party can be taken 
after a judgment by default, by motion to set aside 
the judgment. This question was answered in the 
affirmative by the Supreme Court of Texas, in the 
case of Ebell v. Bursinger, 70 Tex. 120, 8 S. W. 77. 
The court said: 'The court should not render a 
judgment, there being the want of a necessary 
party to a suit. The defendant in such a case has 
a right to presume that the court will not enter 
an erroneous judgment against him, and hence 
should not be held in default until the necessary 
party is brought before the court. If judgment by 
default be taken, it should be set aside upon mo-
tion; and in case the motion be overruled it will be 
reversed upon appeal or a writ of error.' See, also, 
Monday v. Vance, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 374, 32 S. W. 
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599, and Black on Judgments (2d Ed.) Chapt. 325J 
where the author says that a judgment taken by 
default will be set aside as irregular, when it ap-
pears that a real party in interest was not made 
a party defendant. 
"This being true, the trial court should have 
sustained appellant's motion to vacate and set 
aside the judgment. For its failure so to do the 
judgment must be reversed and the cause remand-
ed, with instructions to sustain the motion .to va-
cate the judgment, and to proceed no further until 
the necessary parties are made parties defendant 
by amendment, and that upon appellant's failure 
to do this the suit be dismissed, unless by amend-
ment issue can be joined, that the rights of others 
will not be affected by the judgment; and it is so 
ordered." 
In Vincent Oil Co. v. Gulf Refining Co., 195 Fed. 434 
(1912), the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
held that an oil company which was assignee of an undi-
vided half interest in an oil lease and was in exclusive pos-
session and operating the property, was an indispensable 
party to a suit to establish the validity of a prior lease, 
the necessary effect of which would be to invalidate its 
own, and also, even if it were not a party, to interfere 
with its exclusive possession. 
The court stated: 
"The decree .sought would interfere. with the 
possession of the Producers' Oil Company, which 
is now exclusive of the complainant, and would 
place the complainant in join possession. It would 
set up the Staiti lease and cancel the Hooks lease, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
which is the source of the title held by the Pro-
ducers' Oil Con1pany. It is true that the decree 
would not be binding on the Producers' Oil Com-
pany, but surely that company should be before 
the court to be heard in a case affecting its posses-
sion and the source of its title." 
For other similar cases see: Page v. Town of Gallup, 
191 Pac. 460 (New Mex.) (1920); Egyptiarn Novaculite 
Co. v. Stevenson, 8 Fed. (2) 576 (CCA 8) (1925). 
In American ~Iutttal Building & Loan Co. v. Jones, 
117 P (2) 293 (1941), the Supreme Court of Utah held in 
a quiet title suit that the lower court in joining Utah 
County as a party defendant, on its own motion, was 
correct and proper where the County had title to the 
property by virtue of a valid auditor's deed. 
Justice Pratt, speaking for the Court, stated: 
"The order of the lower court making Utah 
County a party was not an error. The County had 
good tax title. Its subsequent failure to make a 
valid sale did not affect its title. Plaintiff had no 
title. To adjudicate that the title of Robert Jones 
is void does not accomplish anything for plaintiff 
with valid title standing in the County. The Court 
could not adjudicate against the County without 
making the County a party." 
In Ebell v. Bursinger, 70 Tex. 120, 8 S.W. 77 (1888), 
plaintiff brought a suit to cancel a deed conveying to the 
defendant certain real property in trust for the defend-
ant's daughter, Anna Ebell, on the ground that the con-
veyance was procured by threats and intimidation. No 
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Defendant filed a motion to set aside the judgment, which 
was overruled. One ground of the motion was that the 
beneficiary under the deed had not been made a party 
to the suit. In reversing the lower Court's ruling the 
Court stated (at page 77): 
"Two questions are presented by the assign-
ment: First, was the cestui que trust a necessary 
party to the suit~ And second, can the objection 
for want of a necessary party be taken by motion 
in the Court below after default or upon appeal f' 
After holding that the beneficiary was a necessary 
party the Court then considered the question whether the 
objection could be taken after a judgment by default. 
After holding in the affirmative, the Court stated, page 
78 (SW): 
"The court should not render a judgment, 
there being the want of a necessary party to the 
suit. The defendant in such a case has a right to 
presume that the Court will not enter an erroneous 
judgment against him and hence should not be held 
in default until the necessary party is brought be-
fore the Court. If judgment by default be taken, 
it should be set aside upon motion ; and, in case 
the motion be overruled, it will be reversed upon 
appeal or a writ of error." 
·In Monday v. V a.nce, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 37 4, 32 S.W. 
559 (1895), the Court held that the non-joinder of neces-
sary parties defendant could be first made even on ap-
peal. 
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With respect to the water stock involved in this ac-
tion "~e quote fro1n Iron City Sav. Bank v. Isaacsen, 164 
S. E. 520 (1932) ""here the Supreme Court of Virginia 
stated, page 528: 
"The only other equitable· relief prayed is an 
injunction against the ·southeast Lumber Export 
Company, Inc. and its president restraining them 
from transferring on the books of the corporation 
the 139 shares of the stock of the corporation 
standing thereon in the name of Irma Isaacsen, 
which had been assigned and transferred to her by 
Henri Isaacsen. 
"The right of the complainant to such an in-
junction is predicated entirely upon its right to 
have the stock transfer from Henri Isaacsen to 
Irma Isaacsen set aside; and the granting of such 
an injunction would necessarily affect the rights 
and interests of Irma Isaacsen in and to the shares 
of stock. Therefore, she was an indispensable 
party to this bill both in its aspect of a bill to set· 
aside the stock transfer and in its aspect of a bill 
for an injunction. This being so, until the court 
had acquired jurisdiction of her person, or had 
acquired such control over these shares of stock 
as to give it jurisdiction to proceed against this 
stock as a res upon an order of publication as to 
her, it had not acquired actual jurisdiction to grant 
a permanent injunction restraining the corpora-
tion, or its president, from transferring these 
shares of stock on the books of the corporation." 
The Court's attention is also invited to Barguette 
v. Del Curts, 163 P (2) 257, at page 260, where the Su-
preme Court of New Mexico stated: 
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"That an indispensable party defendant has 
been omitted may be raised at any time." 
THE PRESENT JUDGMENT CONSTITUTES A CLOUD ON 
JAY LARSEN'S TITLE. 
Although prior to the filing of the Lis Pendens and 
the entry of the default judgment in this case, _Jay Lar-
sen was the fee owner of record of the 160.84 acres of 
land, excepting the mineral rights, and the 160 shares of 
stock of the Big Six Irrigation Company, both land and 
water stock are now vested by Court decree in plaintiffs 
in an action to which Jay Larsen as such fee owner of 
record was not made a party. He now holds as grantee 
from a grantor whose title has been completely divested 
by the Court and declared null and void. This assertion 
by plaintiffs of adverse interest in his property by formal 
judgment entered by the Court below is a cloud on his 
title·. 
As to what constitutes a cloud of title, we invite 
the Court's attention to the annotation "What Constitutes 
Cloud on Title Removable in Equity" contained in 78 
A.L.R., pages 24 to 313; also Gardner v. Buckeye Savilngs 
& Loan CompOIYIIJJ, 108 W. Va. 673, 152 S. E. 530, 78 
A. L. R. 1; Homewood Re:alty Corporation v. Safe De-
posit & Trust Comp·any, 160 Md. 457, 154 Atl. 58, 78 
A. L. R. 8; Briggs v. Industrial Bank, 197 N. C. 120, 147 
S. E. 815, 78 A. L. R. 20; Trustees of Schools v. Wilson, 
334 Ill. 347, 166 N. E. 55, 78 A. L. R. 22. 
In the Buckeye case, p. 5 of A. L. R., the West Vir-
ginia Court stated : 
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.. What is a cloud~ Black's Law Dictionary 
defines it to be an outstanding claim or incuin-
brance 'Yhich, if valid, would affect or ilnpair the 
title of the owner of a particular estate, and which 
apparently on its face has that effect, but which 
can be shown by extrinsic proof to be invalid or 
inapplicable to the estate in question. In 32 Cyc. 
131-!, the general rule is stated: 'A cloud, such as 
equity "'"ill undertake to remove, is the semblance 
of a title, either legal or equitable, or a claim of 
an interest in lands appearing in some legal form, 
but which is in fact unfounded, and which it would 
be inequitable to enforce.' The attributes gener-
ally recognized as necessary to create a cloud are 
that the claim must be (1) apparently valid, and 
(2) capable of embarrassing title." 
The cases establish that a mere verbal claim or oral 
assertion of ownership or a mere apprehension on the 
part of a property owner that an adverse claim of title 
or interest may be asserted against him, does not con-
stitute a cloud on title. On the other hand, assertions in 
judicial proceedings have been held to constitute a cloud 
on title. See 78 A. L. R. 43. 
The Utah case of Schenck v. Wicks, 23 Utah 576, 
65 Pac. 732 (1901) is cited on page 27 of the A. L. R. 
Annotation. In the Schenck case, this Court stated, page 
581: 
"A cloud on a title is something, such as a 
mortgage, deed, or judgment, etc., which shows 
prima facie some interest in a third party in or to 
the property adverse to the person vested with 
the real title to the same, or to one having an 
interest therein." 
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Under the authorities, by the judgment of the Court 
below it is clear that Jay Larsen's title to his irrgated 
pasture and to his water stock has been clouded. His 
right to possession has been placed in jeopardy. The 
n1erchantability of his title has been seriously damaged. 
RIGHT OF JAY LARSEN TO INTERVENE IN ACTION. 
Again, there can be no doubt of Jay Larsen's right 
to intervene in this action and that the Court below 
erred in denying his motion to set aside the judgment 
and to intervene as a party defendant. 
Even if Larsen had acquired his interest in the prop-
erty while the action was pending or even after the d~ 
fault judgment was entered, he would still have standing 
to contest the validity of the judgment below. See: 104 
A. L. R. 697 and annotation under heading: "N.onparty 
who acquires interest in property pending action or 
after judgment as within benefit of statute or rule pro-
viding for opening, vacating or setting aside of judg-
ments." It is there stated, page 697 : 
"While strangers to the record, unless author-
ized by statute, ordinarily have no standing on 
which to base an application to open, vacate, or 
set aside a judgment, it is by no means true that 
the right to move for the vacation of a judgment 
is strictly limited to the parties to the action, 
where the interests of a non-party will be affected 
by the judgment." 
Se.e, also, Rule 25 (e) of Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure relating to transfer of interest while an action 
is pending. 
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In the present case, Jay Larsen acquired his interest 
many years prior to the suit, having gone into possession 
in 193S under a contract to purchase and receiving his 
warranty deed fron1 defendants thereunder in 1942. His 
fee interest ""as personally known and known of record 
to plaintiffs. His right to intervene under the author-
ities and under the Utah rules is clear. 
In Guenther v. Funk, 274 N. W. 839 (1937), the Su-
preme Court of North Dakota stated the general rule as 
follows: 
"The general rule is that none but the parties 
to a judgment can have it set aside; and that a 
stranger to the record, who was neither a party 
nor privy to the action, cannot move to vacate the 
judgment. 
"This general rule, however, is subject to the 
exception that persons, not nominal parties to the 
action or successsors in interest, but whose rights 
are injuriously affected thereby, may, under 
proper circumstances, have a judgment vacated. 
1 Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 260 et seq.; 34 
c. J., p. 345." 
Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed., Sec. 260, states: 
"When Third Persons May Apply.-The rule 
that none but parties to the judgment are per-
mitted to interfere admits of exceptions, excluding 
from its operation persons not nominal parties 
to the action, but who are necessarily affected by 
the judgment, and who have equities entitled to be 
protected from its operation." 
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Different types of cases are then listed such as 
intervention by a judgment creditor in action against 
debtor, beneficiary in action against trustee, landlord in 
action against tenant, comptroller in action against city, 
indemnitor in action against indemnitee, persons preju. 
dicially affected in proceedings against property, etc. 
Jay Larsen is in privity with defendants as their 
grantee. His interests in both land and water stock have 
been prejudicially affected in that plaintiffs, within a 
period of 30 days, were able by default judgment to have 
such property and the right to possession ve·sted in them-
selves. As defendants' grantee, Jay Larsen is no stranger 
to the record. The title to his property has been vitally 
affected. 
It is, of course, well established that a third party 
will not be allowed to intervene in an action to remove 
cloud on title even though, claiming title to the premises, 
he does not rely upon any source of title sought to be 
established in the action. For example, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court in Moore v. Massengill, 41 S. E. (2d) 
655, 170 A. L. R. 147 (1947) stated: 
"The only question presented on this appeal 
is simply this: May a third party, who claims 
title to the premises involved in an action tore-
move cloud upon title, but who is not relying upon 
any source of title sought to be established in such 
action, be permitted to interplead and have her 
independent claim of title adjudicated therein~ 
Our decisions do not so hold." 
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This rule has long been the law in Utah and was 
first expressed in Moo~re v. Wilson, 1 Utah 187, whe·re it 
w·as held in a quiet title suit that there was a misjoinder 
of parties defendant where the defendants claimed title 
from no common source. The Court stated: 
"This is sufficient to dispose of the case, for 
the defendants having totally distinct claims, and 
having title from no common source, cannot in 
such a case as this, be joined in the same proceed-
ings.'' 
On the other hand, where a third party is in privity 
of estate claiming title from a common source with the 
defendant he may and should be intervened in the action. 
On this question, we invite the Court''S attention to 
Annotation in 170 A. L. R., pages 149-156, entitled "Who 
May Intervene in Suit to Quiet Title". This annotation 
refers to the decision of this Court in West: Point I rriga-
tion Ditch Co. v. Moroni & Mt. P. Irrigation Ditch Co., 
14 Utah 127, 46 P. 762 (1896) as holding that in a suit to 
determine the plaintiff's rights to the waters of a river, 
the owners of an irrigation ditch deriving its water sup-
ply from the river had a right to intervene in the action. 
The above annotation refers to the following cases: 
Knotts v. Tuxburg (1917), 69 Ind. App. 248, 117 
N. E. 282, where it was held to be the duty of the Court 
to admit a railway company as a defendant after intro-
duction, as the last item of evidence in the trial of a quiet 
title action, of a certfied cop·y of a deed, which described 
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lands including those in -controversy, executed in favor 
of the· railway company by one of the defendants. 
West Point Oil & Gas Co. v. DUIYI!n (1929; Tex. Civ. 
App.), 18 S. W. (2d) 267, where the purchaser of a por-
tion of a 200-acre tract was permitted to intervene in an 
action brought by the vendor to remove an alleged void 
n1ortgage as a cloud upon the title to the entire tract in 
order to protect herself on her warranty to the purchaser, 
the court saying that the intervenor "was vitally inter-
ested in this matter, and if it were necessary in order 
to remove such cloud, to cancel any instruments which 
affected the title to his land, he was not only a proper, 
but a nece'ssary party." 
Squarely supporting Jay Larsen's right to intervene 
and not distinguishable from the case at bar is the case of 
Montgomery v. Beck decided by the Supreme Court of 
California in 1928 and reported in 272 Pac. 1058. The 
Court there held that the successor in interest to prop-
erty, whose interest was acquired prior to the commence-
ment of the action, was entitled to intervene in the action 
after the entry of default against his predecessor. The 
Court stated, pages 1058-9: 
"This appeal was submitted upon an order 
to show cause, the respondent having presented 
and filed no brief herein. This action was one to 
quiet title to certain real property. One of the 
defendants named therein was the Los Angeles 
Realty Syndicate, a defunct corporation, jurisdic-
tion over which was obtained by seTvice of process 
upon one of the former directors and then existing 
trustees thereof. The trustees were not made 
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parties to said action, and they permitted said 
defunct corporation to be in default, and the de-
fault thereof upon the proof of such service was 
entered in the action. Thereafter the appellant, 
\Y·. D ..... \shbaugh, Inade application for leave to 
interYene in the action, alleging himself to be the 
owner of the premises in question as the successor 
in interest of said defunct corporation; and in his 
amended co1nplaint, in support of his application, 
he set forth the foundation of his title and owner-
ship of said premises as consisting in a judgment 
obtained by him against said Los Angeles Realty 
Syndicate prior to the institution of the present 
action, decreeing him to be the owner of said 
prennse·s. 
"(1) The plaintiff's opposition to said ap-
plication for intervention was twofold, consisting, 
first, in the contention that the default of said de-
funct corporation, having been duly entered before 
the making of said application for leave to inter-
vene constituted a sufficient ground for the denial 
of the same. There is no merit in this contention. 
An intervener claiming title to property adverse 
to both the plaintiff and the defendant named in 
an action to quiet title cannot be prevented, as to 
his right, to intervene therein by the fact that one 
or all of the named defendants may have suffered 
a default. Morgan v. Bonynge, 157 Cal. 295, 107 
P. 312; Townsend v. Driver, 5 Cal. App. 581, 90 
P. 1071. 
"(2) The second ground of opposition to the 
appellant's asserted right to intervene was based 
upon certain affidavits filed in opposition thereto, 
based upon the rather insufficient averments of 
the applicant's original cross-complaint in inter-
vention. Upon the presentation thereof, however, 
the trial court-granted the said applicant leave to 
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present an amended complaint which definitely set 
forth, as the basis of his right to intervene, the 
judgment obtained by him against the Los Angeles 
Realty Syndicate prior to the institution of the 
present action, decre-eing him, as against said de-
funct corporation, to be the owner of the premises 
in question. No objection having been presented 
by the plaintiff as to the form or sufficiency of 
said amended complaint in intervention, it is 
apparent that it sufficiently stated such an ad-
verse interest in, and ownership of, the premises 
as should have entitled the applicant to an order 
permitting him to intervene in this action, and the 
denial by the trial court of his right so to do must 
be held to be such an abuse of discretion as will 
compel a reversal of its order made herein in so 
far as the same purported to deny to the appellant 
leave to file hils answer and cross-complaint in 
intervention. It is not necessary to consider that 
portion of said order which consisted in a denial 
of the application for an order setting aside the 
default of the Los Angeles Realty Syndicate, 
since, irrespective of the entry of such default, the 
applicant had, as we have been, a right a's an 
adverse claimant of said premises to appear and 
intervene herein. 
"The order is reversed." 
To the same effect is Crofton v. Y owng, 119 P. (2d) 
1003 (1941) (Calif.), where the intervener's predecessor 
was named by plaintiff as sole defendant. Against the 
argument that a litigant has the right in a quiet title 
suit to select hils own defendants, the Court stated, page 
1006: 
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"'It clearly appears from the record before 
us that the entire interest of the original defend-
dant, the bank, had been assigned to Neal and that 
he 'Yas the real party in interest and should have 
been n1ade the defendant. \Vithout hi's presence 
the issues in the quiet title action could not prop-
erly have been determined." 
'See, also: Johnston v .. Lll edina Improvement Club, 
Inc., 116 P. {2d) 272 (\Vash.) (1941); Salina Canyon Coat 
Co. v. Klemrn, et al, 76 Utah 372 (1930). 
Under the foregoing cases and under the specific 
provisions of Rule 22 relating to Interpleader, and Rule 
2±, relating to Intervention, of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Jay Larsen's right to intervene in the action 
cannot be questioned. 
DENIAL OF JAY LARSEN'S MOTION TO INTERVENE ON 
THE GROUND OF PLAINTIFFS' OFFER OF A QUIT CLAIM 
DEED TO THE SURF ACE RIGHTS WAS ERROR. 
The minute entry (R. 56) of the hearing on June 11, 
1952, at Provo, states in part: 
"During argument Mr. Pugsley tendered in 
open Court a quit claim deed of all right, title and 
interest in and to the surface of real estate· and 
water stock referred to in the judgment subject to 
the reserving a right to all mineral, oil and gas in-
terest in the property to Jay Lar'sen." 
The Court's ruling denying Jay Larsen's motion to 
intervene (R. 55) states in part: 
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"In view of the plaintiff's offer made in open 
Court to tender Jay Larsen a quit claim deed to 
the surface rights of the land involved, the motion 
of Jay Larsen to set aside the judgment by default 
and to intervene in the suit is denied." 
Proceeding into the discussion of this aspect of the 
case, we again invite the Court's attention to the fact 
that plaintiffs in this action did not bring a suit to quiet 
title to mineral rights. They brought a suit to set aside 
and cancel a deed to 160.84 acres of land in fee and 160 
shares of stock in the Big Six Irrigation Company. They 
did not sever the mineral rights in their complaint; nor 
were the mineral rights severed in the default judgment. 
They asked for and were adjudged the owners and en-
titled to the possession of the whole works,-lock, stock 
and barrel. Being faced with the long list of authorities 
establishing the necessary and indispensable status of 
Jay Larsen as a party to the suit, and being unable to 
amend their default judgment to have it give a different 
kind of relief. than that prayed for in their complaint, 
plaintiffs attempted to work their way out of their dilem-
ma by the clever maneuver of tendering him a quit claim 
deed to the surface rights and water stock in open Court. 
The maneuver was successful. Without letting Jay Lar-
sen be a party to the suit, the Court thus indirectly per-
mitted plaintiffs to amend their judgment. 
F'rom a practical standpoint, from Jay Larsen's point 
of view, the quit claim deed by itslf would be worth 
little. It is doubtful that such a deed dated now or any 
other time would clear his title. He doesn't know whether 
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plaintiff's father or mother left a will; he doesn't know 
whether their estates are being probated; he doesn't 
kno'v 'Yhether the plaintiffs constitute all of the heirs of 
Joseph F. ''Tarr and Elizabeth Warr; he doesn't know if 
any judgment creditors might have right~s against the 
property; he doesn't know whether plaintiffs, after giving 
the quit claim deed would then turn around and institute 
suit against him to have it set aside and cancelled just as, 
in this action, they sought to and did have their father's 
and n1other's warranty deed set aside. Then, too, hE:' 
would be in the dark with respect to the question of value 
of use and occupancy of the premises for the years of 
possession prior to the date of the deed. In short, he 
doesn't want the deed, won't accept the deed, and, not 
having been made a party to the action, shouldn't be 
forced to accept the deed. 
From the legal standpoint the question then is,-
~Iust Jay Larsen be forced to institute an independent 
action against plaintiffs (at the expense of defendants 
under their warranty deed) to clear his title, or will his 
clearly established right to intervene in this action be 
recognized~ 
We suggest that Jay Larsen be allowed to intervene 
because the Court below erred in denying his petition. 
In denying Jay Larsen's motion on the sole ground of 
plaintiffs' offer of a quit claim to the surface rights and 
water stock, the Court below recognized that Jay Larsen 
had some interest in the property. The plaintiffs them .. 
selves in making the offer publicly and of record reeog-
nized that their 30-day default judgment was erroneous 
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and illegal with re'spect to the surface rights and water 
stock held by the defendants' grante·e. 
We quote from Rule 54 (c) (2) of the Utah Rules: 
"(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by 
default shall not be different in kind from or 
exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in 
the demand for judgment." (Italics supplied.) 
The note under the above rule states: 
"* * * also, the word ''specifically' was inserted 
on line 8 to make sure that a general prayer for 
relief would not be· sufficient to grant relief dif-
ferent than that 'specifically' requested * * *" 
The above rule is to be compared with the old rule in 
the Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 104-30-5, which only 
stated that the relief "cannot exceed" that demanded in 
the complaint. 
Plaintiffs, having gotten by default judgment "speci-
fically" what they requested, could not thereafter modify 
their judgment to sever the mineral interests from the 
property covered by the judgment. To modify the judg-
ment, the Court would first have to set it aside and 
the case would then be on the merits which is exactly 
where, in this case, plain tiffs don't want the case to be. 
The attention of the Court is invited to the provi-
sions of the Judicial c·ode, Sections 104-40-12 and 13, 
concerning the service of process and the rendition of 
judgments in quiet title suits. These sections seem to 
imply that all persons with known interests should be 
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joined and unknn\vn persons, as "~en, 'vho elailu soute 
interest in the property . 
.-..\.s Jay Larsen 'Yas in possession and clainting ad-
versely to plain tiffs, Rule 9 (a) ( 3) would seem to infer 
that if the plaintiffs did not kno,y· his na1ne he should at 
least have been listed as .. lTnknown". 
l~nder r:tah practice, the authorized procedure which 
should have been followed by the Court below was to have 
granted Jay Larsen's petition to inte-rvene. Plaintiffs 
could then have disclaimed as to him and the case tried 
on the merits between plaintiffs and defendants with re-
spect to the oil rights only. Section 104-40-3 of the 
Judicial Code relates to disclaimer. Or the plaintiffs 
could have amended their complaint to restrict it to a 
suit over the mineral rights. Either way, Jay Larsen 
would have been eliminated and his rights protected. 
A case closely resembling the case at bar is Townsend 
v. Driver, (1907) 5 Cal. App. 581, 90 P. 1071. This ca·se 
was an appeal from the judgment quieting title. and from 
an order denying a motion to vacate such judgment. 
Plaintiff had filed his complaint but did not joint appel-
lants as parties to the action. The Court granted appel-
lants leave to intervene and each complaint in interven-
tion alleged that the interveners were the owners of spe-
cified portions of the land described in the complaint. 
Thereupon the plaintiff's attorneys filed in the 
Clerk's office a written direction to the Clerk to enter a 
dismissal of the action as to the intervening defendants. 
Afterwards, and without notice to the interveners, the 
Court ordered the default of the defendants who had not 
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been included in the dismissal order and gave judgment 
against such defendants. The Court likewise decreed 
that plaintiff was the owner and in possession of the 
premises described and quieted plaintiff's title therein. 
In such judgment it was recited that plaintiff, by his 
attorneys, had dismissed as to certain defendants which 
were named, but neither in the order to the' Clerk nor 
in the judgment were the interveners designated as such, 
nor did it appear that any order was made .by the Court 
vacating its order granting leave to intervene unless the 
recital in the judgment had such effect. 
Thereafter, interveners moved the Court to set aside 
its judgment because they had been given no notice of 
the trial of the action. This motion was denied and from 
the order refusing to vacate the judgment appellants filed 
their appeal. The Court stated, page 1072 : 
"The action to quiet title is one for the re-
covery of real property. South Tule, etc. Ditch 
Co. v. King, 144 Cal. 455, 77 Pac. 1032. The real 
property so sought to be recovered is, therefore, 
the subject-matter of such action. The order of 
the superior court granting leave to intervene de-
termined that interveners had an interest in the 
matter in litigation, and under section 387, Code 
of Civil Procedure, were entitled as parties to 
avail themselves of all of the procedure and rem-
edie:s to which the defendants were entitled for the 
purpose of defeating the action or resisting plain-
tiff's claim. People v. Perris Irr. District, 132 
Cal. 290, 64 Pac. 399, 773. It appears from the 
bill of exceptions that interveners served and filed 
their complaints, setting forth the grounds upon 
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'Yhich their intervention rested, due service of 
'vhich is certified in the bill, 'vhich 1nust be ac-
cepted as service upon all parties to the action, as 
required by Section 887, l'iode of Civil Procedure, 
and the clailu to the subject Inatter is an interest 
adYerse to both plaintiff and defendants. The 
only relief sought, however, by these co1nplaints 
in intervention, was that plaintiff take nothing 
andthatinterveners recover costs. Under the law, 
their position was thereafter that of "plaintiff in 
intervention, uniting "~i th the defendant in the 
cause in resisting the demands of plaintiff in the 
cause." St. Charles R. R. Co. v. Fidelity, etc. Co., 
33 South 574, 109 La. 491. The inaction of the 
defendants in permitting their default does not 
preclude intervener fro1n his relief." 
The plaintiffs and the Court below have recognized 
Jay Larsen's interest. He should have been allowed to .. 
intervene. The Townsend case quoted above holds that 
after such intervention, the plaintiff, without disclaiming 
or modifying his complaint with respect to the inter-
veners, could not proceed to dismiss the action as to them 
only and take default against the non-intervening de-
fendants. The above opinion of the California Court 
seems in harmony with Rule 41 of the Utah Rules relating 
to the dismissal of an action, and it is apparent that under 
this rule, after Jay Larsen is allowed to intervene, plain-
tiffs would not be allowed to dismiss the action as against 
him except on such conditions as the Court deems proper 
which would require, of course, the rendition of such a 
judgment as would not p·ut a cloud on Jay Larsen's title 
to the property. 
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From the foregoing authorities it is clear that the 
plaintiffs' offer of a quit claim dee·d to the surface rights 
and water stock was not a proper ground on which to 
deny the clear right of Jay Larsen to intervene in the 
suit to protect his interest in the property. 
UPON BEING APPRISED THAT A NECESSARY AND IN-
DISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE SUIT HAD NOT BEEN 
JOINED THE COURT BELOW SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED 
THE ACTION. 
Reference has been made heretofore to the provisions 
of Rule 21 relating to the misjoinder and non-joinder of 
parties. Under this rule, of course, misjoinder of parties 
is not ground for dismissal of an action. However, the 
non-joinder of an indispensable party doers render the 
action subject to dismissal. 
Rule 12 (b) set forth the defenses and objections 
which shall be asserted by a pleading or by a motion. 
Reference is made under subdivilsion (1) to lack of juris-
diction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction 
over the person, ( 3) improper venue, ( 4) insufficiency of 
process, ( 5) insufficiency of service of process, ( 6) fail-
ure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and of 
significance here, (7) "failure to join an indispen~sable 
party".· 
Under Rule 12 (h) it is provided that all defenses. 
and objections are waived unless made by a motion or 
if no motion ha.s been made, in the answer or reply, ex-
cept that the defense of "failure to join an indispensable 
party" may be made by a later pleading if one is per-
mitted or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or; 
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at the trial on the Inerits. It is thus seen that the failure 
to join an indispensable party is a special n1atter and 
fatal to the Inaintenance of a suit. 
The objection of Jay Larsen's necessary and indis-
pensable status 'vas timely raised by defendants in their 
first motion filed 'vith the Court on Nov. 20, 1951 and 
was 'vithin the allo,.vable period prescribed by Rule 60 (b) 
which governs n1otions made to the Court to obtain relief 
from a final judgment. R.ule 60 (b) prescribes a three 
months' limitation on reasons 1, 2, 3 and 4 of said Rule, 
which do not include the objection of non-joinder of an 
indispensable party. It is therefore probable that a 
longer time limit would be allowed in advancing this 
ground which would perhaps be included under No. 7, 
the catch all provision of Rule 60 (b). This point, how-
ever, is academic here for the reason mentioned above, 
namely, that the motion to set aside the judgment ren-
dered by the Court below both for the reason of lack of 
an indispensable party and entry of the judgment due 
to the defendants' mistake, inadvertence, surprise or ex-
cusable neglect was filed within the period of three months 
from the date of the entry of default and also the default 
judgment. 
Defendants' motion of November 20, 1951 was based, 
among other things, on the affidavit of meTits and the 
proposed answer of defendants filed with the motion 
which answer sets up as a complete defense to the action 
(R. 22) the non-joindeT of Jay Larsen as a necessary and 
indispensable party to the action. The objection having 
been timely made and properly made, the Court should 
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then have. dismissed the action or in lieu thereof required 
by order the plaintiffs to join Jay Larsen as a party to 
the action, and Carter Oil Company, as well, if complete 
relief is to be accorded between the interested parties. 
Jay Larsen's status was again brought to the Court's 
attention by the supplementary motion of defendants 
to have the Court reconsider its ruling. It was again 
advanced by defendants' further supplemental motion 
made solely on the ground of La~sen's indispensability 
(and Carter Oil Company as well),. and finally it was 
advanced by Jay Larsen's own m9tion to have the judg-
ment set aside and to intervene in the action. 
SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENT AT INTERVENTION OF JAY 
LARSEN WILL SET IT ASIDE AS TO DEFENDANTS~ . 
We come next to the important questi?n whether if. 
Jay Larsen is ·allowed to intervene and the.judgment set·· 
aside a:s to him, the judgment must likewise.be set aside 
as to the defendants. 
. ·. . 
We have heretofore discussed the authorities which 
establish the right of a third party to intervene in a 
quiet title suit as a party defendant where his title is -·. -· 
derived from a common source with .that sought to he 
e~stablished in the ·action. F·or example, in 118 A. L. R. 
1401-2, in annotatton entitled "Joinder of claims to sepa-
rate parcels in suit to quiet or to remove cloud on title 
or to determ~ne various claims to land", reference is 
made to the case of White Point Oil and Gas Co. v. Dunn, 
(1929 Tex. Civ. App.) 18 S.W. (2d) 267. This case held 
in an action to cancel an alleged void n1ortgage covering 
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an entire tract of land that an intervener who has pur-
chased 'Yith a warranty of title a part of the tract is a 
necessary party to the suit. See Buchanan Coal Co. ,,,_ 
S,mith, (1914) 115 \T a. 704, 80 S. E. 794. 
Free1nan on Judgments, 5th Ed., Sec. 101, states: 
~·In case of a default by one or more of sev-
eral defendants as to 'vhom but one judgment is 
proper, judgment against the parties in default 
should not be entered until the ca·se is finally dis-
posed of as to the others." 
Again, in 'Sec. 259, the Rule is expressed: 
~'If a judgment prejudicially affects two or 
more persons, either of them may move for its 
vacation and, if proper cause is shown, may obtain 
relief." 
The matter is more fully covered by an annotation 
in 78 A. L. R. 938 under the heading "Successful Defense 
by One Co-defendant, or a Finding for 'Defendants' as 
inuring to the benefit of defaulting defendant". At page 
939 the general rule is stated as follows : 
"The question whether a successful defense 
by some of several codefendants may inure to the 
benefit of a defaulting defendant is dependent 
upon the nature, scope, and extent of the defense 
interposed by the answering defendants, and, to 
some extent, upon the joint or several nature of 
the right asserted. 
"The courts are agreed with practical unanim-
ity that in actions against several defendants 
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jointly, where the defense interposed by the an-
swering defendant is not personal to himself, (as 
is the defense of infancy, coverture or bankruptcy 
on the part of the pleader), but common to all, as 
where it goes to the whole right of the plaintiff 
to recover at all, as distinguished from his right 
to recover as against any particular defendant, 
or questions the merits or validity of the plain-
tiff's entire cause of action in general, or his right 
to sue, such defense, if successful, inures to the 
benefit of the defaulting defendants both in actions 
at law and suits in equity, with the result that 
final judgment must be entered not merely in 
favor of the answering defendant, but also in 
favor of the defaulting defendants." 
See also, cases cited under VII of Annotation, p. 
945 A. L. R. Vol. 78, entitled "Applications of rule' where 
defense negatives right of plaintiff to sue or to recover 
at all." Reference is made to the case of Minium v. Solel, 
(1916) (Mo.) 183 S. W. 10-37, which involved a suit 
against a City and another defen~ant to quiet title to 
land. The City defaulted and the other defendant de-
fended on the ground (1) that the strip of land in con-
troversy was a public alley of the defendant city, and (2) 
that the defendant himself had title to the land. The 
Court held that a judgment by default could not be en-
tered against the City because the claim of the other 
defendant was founded upon the City's title so that a 
successful defense by ·such defendant necessarily demon-
trated that the plaintiff had no cause of action against 
the City. 
.t 
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It is, of course, clear in the case at bar that Jay 
Larsen's title is founded upon the defendants' title. A 
successful defense by Jay Larsen to the action would 
necessarily den1onstrate there 'vas no cause of action 
against the defendants. .A.t page 950 of 78 A. L. R. the 
applicable la'v is stated as follows: 
'~\\" .. here, in suits in equity against several 
defendants jointly interested in the outcome of 
the controversy, the plaintiff fails to make a case 
or to prove his cause of action as against the 
denial of his right to relief by one of the defend-
ants, he cannot have a final decree as against ~he 
defendant against whom a decree pro confesso is 
entered by default, since the plaintiff in such case 
must recover on the strength of his own case, and 
by his failure to make out a case he disproves the 
equity of his entire cause. 
"Thus, in a suit in equity to quiet title to land, 
against several defendants, privies in title, some 
of whom answered denying the right of the plain-
tiff to relief, and others defaulted, it was held that 
unless the complainant proved his claim as against 
the answering defendants, he could not have a 
decree as against the defaulting defendants. The 
Court said: 'But it must be remembered that com-
plainant makes his claim against such defendants 
upon the same title or right that he does against 
those that did appear, and none other. The right 
he was bound to establish so as to satisfy the 
chancellor that he should have relief, though there 
had been no appearance by any of the defendants. 
And though neither of the defendants had an-
swered, if the proof made shows a want of equity 
in complainant's case, he must fail in his action . 
. . . . And he should have no greater relief against 
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those in default .than against those who have in 
fact answered. (Citing cases) 
The Court's attention is also invited to the annota-
tion in 155 A. L. R. p. 66 entitled "Opening mortgage 
foreclosure decree to bring in omitted parties". This 
annotation shows that the Courts have been liberal in re-
opening judgments of foreclosure upon the ground that 
various parties having an interest in the property had 
not originally been joined in the action. 
POSITION OF CARTER OIL COMPANY: 
As heretofore indicated, the plaintiffs, by ratifying 
defendants' oil and gas lease with Carter Oil Company, 
have put the latter in a neutral position to date. This 
so-called law-suit ratification by Carter, however, does 
not make Carter a stranger to this case. Although pre-
sumably paying rentals to both plaintiffs and defendants 
at present, when oil comes, a double royalty will not be 
paid. The one royalty will merely be impounded pending 
the outcome of this litigation. The suit with respect to 
the mineral rights is in substance· a suit by two interested 
claimants against the potential fund of royalties. It is 
generally held in the "Fund" cases that the holder of the 
fund must be joined in the action in order that effective 
relief can be accomplished by the Court between the 
various parties to the action. Examples of this are suits 
against an insurance company by two or more persons 
claiming the proceeds of insurance policies and suits 
between the beneficiaries of a trust fund. S.ee· 65 Har-
vard Law Review 1050-9. 
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It 'vould appear, therefore, that the Court, on its own 
1notion, or the motion of others, should join Carter Oil 
Con1pany along with Jay Larsen, in order that complete 
and effective relief n1ay be granted by the. Court in this 
case. 
PLAINTIFFS, ALTHOUGH ASKING FOR EQUITY, HAVE 
NOT DONE EQUITY. 
As heretofore pointed out, plaintiffs in filing their 
action to have their father and mother's warranty deed 
set aside, and cancelled, as an outlawed and void mort-
gage, made no offer to pay any portion of the mortgage 
debt or interest thereon, nor any part of the -taxes and 
wate-r assessments which have been paid on the property 
by defendants and Jay Larsen for a period of over 30 
years. They made no offer to pay for any of the im-
provements on the land. 
In some states there is a grave doubt in the first 
place whethe·r a mortgage can be removed at all as a 
cloud on title by the courts in an action by the mortgagor 
or his successors. For example, in Coombs vs. Coombs, 
249 Ky. 155, 60 S.W. (2d) 368, 89 A.L.R. 1098, the court 
stated: 
"A cloud, such as requires the intervention of 
a Court to remove, would seem to be one that the 
applicant for its removal had neither created nor 
was under any personal obligation to discharge, 
·or remove; and for which reasons we repeat that . 
it is even doubtful if the Arkansas Court had jur-
isdiction to relieve the land in that State from the 
lien that defendant had put upon it." 
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On the other hand the general rule appears to be as 
follows, taken from 164 A. L. R. 1393, in annotation 
entitled "Statute of Limitations or Presumption of Pay-
ment from Lapse of Time as Ground for Affirmative 
Relief from Debt or Lien" : 
"In the application of the general rule that 
the statute of limitations may not be asserted as 
a ground for affirmative relief, in conjunction with 
the equitable maxim that 'he who seeks equity 
must do equity', the majority of courts, in the 
absence of a statute, declaring a different rule, 
hold that a court of equity will not, at the suit of 
a mortgagor or his successor in interest, cancel 
a real estate- mortgage or other security given for 
a debt, for the purpose of removing a cloud of 
quieting title, where the only ground urged for 
such relief is that the statute of limitations has 
run against the right to enforce the encumbrance, 
while the debt secured remains unpaid; in such 
case equity will require the plaintiff to do equity 
or offer to do equity by paying or offering to pay 
the lien." 
See also p. 1396 where the abo:ve rule is held applic-
able to the heirs of a mortgagor. Furthermore, the long 
delay of over 30 years in asserting any adverse interest 
in the property and until after their father and mother 
were dead and not until the discovery of oil adjacent to 
the property, shows that the plaintiffs have an unmeri-
torious action, long since barred by laches. 
See Sanders v. Flenniken, 21 S.W. (2d) 847, 
180 Ark. 303. 
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THE ASSESSMENT OF COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
WAS ERROR. 
Paragraph 5 of the default judgment (R. 6) award-
ing plaintiffs their costs of Court was contrary to the 
provisions of Section 104-40-3 of the Judicial Code. 
THE COURT l\I.AY IMPOSE REASONABLE CONDITIONS 
TO THE VACATING OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
Defendants in the Court below stated that they would 
be glad upon the setting aside of the default judgment 
to accept such terms as the Court saw fit to impose, in-
cluding costs, disbursements, fees, etc., of plaintiffs. See 
21 _A_. L. R. ( 2d) 863. 
JUDGMENT BELOW UNLESS SET ASIDE WILL BE A PRO-
JJFIC SOURCE OF LITIGATION. 
Unless Jay Larsen and Carter Oil Company are 
joined in this action as necessary and indispensable 
parties, the judgment below will only provoke more law-
suits. The tests of indispensability are grounded not 
only on conceptions of fair play whi1ch permit all inter-
ested parties to have their day in Court. The·y are 
grounded on practical considerations as well. These con-
siderations have been said to be (1) Effect on absent 
person, (2) Danger of inconsistent decision, (3) Multi-
plicity of suits, and ( 4) the Rendition of hollow judg-
ments. Each of these has application here. 
Jay Larsen's interests, and those of Carter Oil Com-
pany as well, have been vitally affected by the judgment 
below. Larsen's title has been clouded and damaged. 
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Carter is presu1nably payi:J;lg two sets of rentals and 
knows not from whom it hoJds. 
If Jay Larsen is forced to bring an independent 
action, the decision in that case will be contrary to and 
inconsistent with the judgment rendered in this case. The 
issue of his case is the issue of this case. His defense 
is the defendants' defense. Contrary judgments would 
have been rendered by the same Court on. the same iden-
tical issue. 
Multiplicity of suits in the present circumstances, is 
not merely probable but certain. The judgment below 
rings hollow and settles nothing. The warranties of title 
to Carter and Jay Larsen are involved. The validity of 
defendants' oil and gas lease as affected by the judgment 
below would certainly be tested in further litigation. The 
Colorado Bank's duties to its trust beneficiaries would 
require a real and genuine effort to secure. a test of the 
validity of the lease not on the basis· of the present judg-
ment but on the merits. 
In view of the foregoing, defendants, respectfully 
suggest that the default judgment below be set aside on 
the ground that necessary and indispensable parties were 
not joined as parties defendant and given an opportunity 
to be heard in the action. 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO SHOW THAT 
THEIR FAILURE TO ANSWER WAS DUE TO MISTAKE, 
INADVERTENCE, SURPRISE OR EXCUSABLE NEGLECT 
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AND IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
AND VACATE THE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
The Court belo'v (R. 31) denied defendants' 1notion 
to set aside the judgment and ruled that the innocent 
and honest mistake of D.on Barr, defendants' process 
agent in Utah, "\Yas inexcusable. Defendants' supple-
mental motion to have the Court reconsider its ruling 
was also denied (R. 55). This was, we respectfully sub-
mit, error. The error lies in the refusal of the District 
Court to give any practical consequence to the policy 
now embedded in the new Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
that the Rules ''shall be liberally construed to secure the. 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action." Rule 1 (a). 
Rule 55 (c) provides : 
" (c) Setting aside default. For good cause 
shown the court may set aside an entry of default 
and, if a judgment by default has been entered, 
may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 
60 (b)." 
Rule 60 (b) provides in part : 
"(b) J\IIistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable 
Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence ; Fraud, etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice, relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons : ( 1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; * * * 
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"The motion shall be made within a reason-
able time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or ( 4), not 
more than three months after the judgment, order 
or proceeding was entered or taken * * *." 
The Summons in this action was served on July 31, 
1951. The default was ente-red August 21, 1951, ana the 
default judgment entered on August 31, 1951. Three 
months from the entry of default thus expired on Novem-
ber 21, 1951. Defendants' motion was filed on N ovembe·r 
20, 1951, the day before the deadline. 
Defendants first heard "that some kind of a suit 
had been filed" against them on N o:vember 7, 1951, 
through a telephone call to Ross Bray, an officer of both 
defendants, from John Cook, of the Carter Oil Company 
( R. 11). That afternoon Bray dispatched a letter to the 
Clerk of the District Court in Vernal asking for the 
name of plaintiffs' attorney to write to "as no summons 
or notice of any kind has ever been served upon either 
Company." Cook called back on hour or so later the same 
day advising the suit had been filed by the W arr family 
and giving the name of the W arr attorneys, Pugsley, 
Hayes & Rampton. Bray, that afternoon, then called 
Don Barr, Cashier of the Bank of Vernal, in Vernal who 
said he recalled no papers having ever been served on 
him and that he would investigate. Bray also called 
Mr. Baer that afternoon at the Colorado National Bank, 
which bank as testamentary trustee has the controlling 
interest in the Van Kleeck companies. Baer, an officer 
of both companies, is Assistant Trust Officer of the Bank. 
Bray also tried to .reach Malcolm Lindsay, President 
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of the Van I\Jeeek l\Iortgage (~ontpany, but did not reach 
him till the follo,ving n1orning. Bray, after ronsulting 
'Yith LindsaY, called Baer nt the bank and asked him 
. ' 
to order through Don Barr at \T ernal certified copies of 
the complaint, snn1mons, sheriff's return and decree. 
That same morning, N oven1ber 8, 1951, Baer called 
Don Barr at \T ernal "Tho informed him he "had not heard 
of any such suit eyer having been filed against the com-
panies." (R. 13). Baer asked Don Barr to secure the 
court papers in the action right away and send them 
to Denver air mail special delivery. The papers did not 
arrive on Frida-y, November 9th. Baer came into the 
bank on Saturday morning, November lOth, a day on 
'Yhich the bank is normally closed, to see if the papers 
had arrived. Photostatic- copies of the papers had arrived 
Saturday morning, except for the complaint. That morn-
ing Baer conferred with Bray, the bank's attorneys, 
Blood, Silverstein and Torgan, and again called Don 
Barr long distance on the telephone for the complaint. 
Baer went to the bank on Monday, the Armistice Day 
holiday, but the complaint had not arrived. The com-
plaint arrived on the morning of Tuesday, November 
13th. In the meantime, Mr. Lindsay, President of the 
Mortgage Company, died on November 11th, 1951. 
On the morning of Tuesday, November 13th, Baer 
consulted with Bray, the bank's attorneys, Blood, 'Silver-
stein and Torgan, and with Mr. Merritt H. Perkins, head 
of the Trust Department of the Colorado National Bank 
about the immediate retention of Utah counsel. Around 
the middle of the day, November 13th, Mr. Perkins called 
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C. M. Gihnour at Salt Lake City, Utah, and employed 
Messrs. Dey, Hoppa ugh, Mark & Johnson to a.ct as coun-
sel in the matter for the Van Kleeck companies. Confer-
ences in Denve-r were immediately called, Baer's affidavit 
being executed in Denver on Friday, November 16th, and 
Bray's affidavit on Saturday, November 17th. Don Barr 
came up to Salt Lake City and executed his affidavit on 
Monday, November 19th. Defendants' motion, affidavit of 
1nerits, proposed answer, and other papers attached to 
the motion, were filed with the Court in Vernal on Tues-
day, November 20th, 1951. 
These facts are set forth somewhat extensively to 
show with what diligence defendants moved in taking 
immediate steps to have the default judgment entered 
in this case set aside. 
The facts as they developed with relation to the 
service of Summons in this action on Don Barr, defend-
ants' process agent in Utah, are perfectly clear. 
Approximately four and one half months only after 
his appointment as defendants' process agent, namely, 
on July 31, 1951, sometime during the working day, 
Sheriff H. M. Snyder of Uintah County walked into the 
Bank of Vernal to serve the papers in this action on Don 
Barr. Barr, at the time, was behind the second teller's 
window on the left as you go in the main entrance of the 
bank. The Sheriff walked up to the window and said 
he had some papers for him. Barr asked what they were. 
The Sheriff gave him the papers, writing the service· on 
them at the time. Barr then said to the Sheriff: "These 
papers are not for me" and handed them back. Barr 
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then stated: ~'There must be son1e mistake, these papers 
are for \ .. aughn v'7arr, not Don Barr." The Sheriff then 
pushed the papers baek under the grill and said he was 
leaving then1 'Yith him nevertheless. 
The Sheriff, in his affidavit (R. 45) stated: 
HI have a clear recollection of the incident 
and there is no doubt in my mind whatsoever, 
that Don Barr made an honest mistake in mis-
apprehending the i1nport of the papers being 
served upon him because of the close similarity 
between the nan1e ';---aughn W arr and his own 
name, Don Barr.~, 
~Ir. N.J. ~Ieagher, President of the Bank of Vernal, 
was in the bank the day the Sheriff came in. After the 
Sheriff left, ~Ieagher walked over to Barr and said : 
"Don, what were those papers the 'Sheriff brought in~" 
Barr replied: "There was some mistake. The papers did 
not pertain to me or the bank. They were for a man by 
the name of Warr" (R. 47). 
Don Barr has filed three affidavits (R. 26, 46 and 53). 
They show that: 
(a) He accepted the appointment as de-
fendants' process agent in Utah in March, 1951. 
(b) He received no specific instructions con-
cerning his duties, nor did he expect any, because 
he knew and realized that his sole and single duty 
was merely to forward any papers pertaining to 
the Van Kleeck companies to their offices in Den-
ver, Colorado, and that he had no other or further 
authority to act for the companies. 
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(c) He noticed the name Vaughn W arr on 
the papers exhibited to him by the Sheriff but 
did not see or have his attention called to the 
names of the Van Kleeck companies on such 
papers. 
(d) Because of the similarity between his 
own name, Don Barr, and that of plaintiff, Vaughn 
Warr, he made the mistake of thinking that the 
papers were intended for Vaughn Warr. 
(e) He stated to the Sheriff that there must 
be so1ne mistake. 
(f) The Sheriff did not explain why he was 
serving him or attempt to correct his mistaken 
impression concerning for whom the papers were 
intended. 
(g) He never saw the papers again and no 
one knows what happened to them. 
(h) If he had se·en, but for his mistake, the 
names of the Van Kleeck companies on the papers, 
it would have immediately recalled to mind his 
appointment, a short time before, as their process 
agent in Utah and he would immediately have for-
warded the papers to the companies in Denver, 
Colorado. 
There seemed to be a slight conflict in Barr's first 
two affidavits in that in the second one (R. 53), which 
plaintiffs' secured from him the morning of the hearing 
in Vernal, he stated that when served with process "he 
had forgotten about the fact" that he had been appointed. 
In his first affidavit (R. 26) however, he had said that if 
he had seen or had his attention called to the VanKleeck 
names he would have forwarded the papers to the com-
panies in Denver (R. 27, para. 5). To clea.r up this appar-
ent conflict, in his third affidavit (R. 46) Barr stated that 
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if his attention had been called to the , ... an l(Jeeck na1nes 
it would haYe inunediately recalled to 1nind the fact of 
his appointn1ent. In other "Tords, "·hat he n1eant by 
"forgotten" "~as that on the day in question his appoint-
ment as process agent \Yas not in mind but that it would 
have been called to Inind if he had seen or had his atten-
tion called to the \""an Kleeck nan1es. The \:""an Kleeck 
name is itself unusual. Barr had just been appointed 
agent a fe".,. months before and the possibility that his 
appointment was buried in his memory beyond recall is 
of course absurd. The plaintiffs have made no effort to 
controvert Barr's last affidavit. 
Cases from numerous jurisdictions, including Utah, 
have been especially lenient in setting aside judgments 
where the agent or attorney was the only one at fault. 
Where the principal was also shown to be at fault a 
somewhat stricter attitude is observed in the cases. With 
this in view, plaintiffs in the Court below laid great 
stress on the claimed dereliction and negligence of the 
defendant companies and the Colorado National Bank 
in not giving Don Barr detailed instructions concerning 
his duties. The short and complete answer, of course, to 
this argument is that there were not any duties attached 
to the appointment except one, and that was merely to 
forward any Van Kleeck papers served upon him to 
Denver, Colorado. In accepting the appointment, Barr 
knew and realized that this was his only and exclusive 
duty. How then can the defendants be charged with 
some fault or negligence in not putting into writing, 
after Barr's written acceptance of his appointment, the 
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one and only duty which Barr, as agent, already knew 
and realized was his only duty. 
We point out also the care with which Barr himself, 
as Cashier of the Bank of Vernal, was _initially selected 
and appointed after discussions with officers of the 
Colorado National Bank and at the suggestion of the 
Colorado bank. When the cashier of a bank is selected, 
one would ordinarily be thought to be selecting just 
about as reliable and dependable a type of person as it 
is possible to select under any circumstances. 
We come then to the pertinent question whether Don 
Barr's honest mistake was so inexcusable that the Court 
below was correct in refusing to set aside the default 
judgment entered against his principals, the defendants 
and appellants herein. 
In Brown v. Beck, 169 P. (2d) 855, the Supreme 
Court of Arizona stated: 
"A mistake exists when a person, under some 
erroneous conviction of law or fact, does, or 
omits to do, some act which, but for the. erroneous 
conviction, he would not have done or omitted. 
Jeremy, Eq. Jur. 358. It may arise either from 
unconsciousness, ignorance, forgetfulness, imposi-
tion or misplaced confidence. Bisph. Eq. Par.185." 
Barr's mistake was in erroneously apprehending 
that the papers brought into the Bank at Vernal by the 
Sheriff were not intended for him. He made this mistake, 
not dishonestly or fraudulently, but for the simple reason 
that he thought the papers were for Vaughn Warr, not 
Don Barr. The mistake wa.s caused by the close similarity 
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of the t\YO na1nes. It w·as an innocent mistake, an honest 
n1istake, and one that had a plausible. and legitimate 
reason behind it. It is this reason, \Ve think, which n1akes 
the n1istake excusable. 
Plaintiffs argue, and the Court below felt, that 
Barr's reason \Yas no excuse, that his mistake was abso-
lutely and utterly inexcusable. However, we point out 
to the Court that on this basis the liberal policy of Rule 
60 (b) would have little if any reasonable scop·e of prac-
tical application. Courts have repeatedly set aside judg-
ments, for example, where the papers on being mailed 
by the process agent are lost or misdirected in the mails, 
or where, by reason of a mix-up in a lawyer's office, a 
lawyer does not appear in court to defend his client's 
action. In a strict sense there is no excuse for mail being 
lost or misdirected or for a lawyer not attending to his 
client's business or for any mistake for that matter. 
All the Rule requires is that there be a legitimate reason 
for the mistake. 
See: Huntington Cab Co. v. American Fidelity & 
Casualty Co., Inc., 4 F.R.D. 496; United States v. Mutual 
Const. Corporation, 3 F.R.D. 227; Rawlins. v. Wilson, 187 
P. (2d) 322; Bernards v. Grey, 218 P. (2d) 597; Brown 
v. Beck, 169 P. (2d) 855; Friedrich v. Roland, 213 P. (2d) 
423; Dinke v. Bowes, 176 P. (2d) 81; Reynolds v. Gladys 
Belle Oil Co., 243 P. 576; Barney v. Platte Vall-ey Public 
Power d!; Irrigation Dist., 23 N.W. (2d) 335. 
Particular attention of the Court is invited to the 
California case of Friedrich v. Roland, decided in 1950, 
cited above, which involved a mistake not of an agent 
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but of the defendant herself. She failed to answer because 
when served with summons she believed she no longer 
had any interest in the property involved. The reason 
for her erroneous belief was the fact that she was un-
aware that a property settlement agreement she had 
signed did not in fact convey her interest in certain com-
munity property. Just prior to the filing of her motion 
she learned she did have an interest. The refusal of 
the trial court to set aside the default judgment was. 
reversed by the appellate court. The Court stated: 
"S.ound policy favors the determination of 
actions on the merits." 
Freeman on Judgments) 5th Ed., Vol. 1, page 474, 
summarizes the mistake cases as follows: 
"ThQ grounds of mistake most frequently 
relied upon for relief are in the fact of the service 
of process, or in the date at which the party 
served must appear, or at which the action is 
set for trial. Because the lower courts exercise 
a discretion with which the appellate courts are 
loath to interfere, as well as from other causes, 
there is not an entire harmony of decision upon 
these subjects, but we think it a fair inference 
from the reported cases that if the court is con-
vinced that the alleged mistake was an honest 
one .and was the sole cause of the moving party's 
not being represented at the trial or not appear-
ing in the action in due time, relief will be grant-
ed.'' 
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And again, at pages 494-5, it is stated: 
··_..\.nd gTeater lenienev is shown in son1e cases 
'vhere a p~rty is obliged to act through agents. 
Thus relief 'Yas given to a rity \Yhere sunnnons 
had neYer con1e to the knowledge of the city attor-
ney because of the neglect or inadvertence of the 
mayor or those in charge of his office." 
In Utah Commercial Bank v. Trtttmbo, 17 Utah 198, 
this Court stated : 
.. The policy of the law is that every man shall 
have his day in Court before judgment shall be 
entered against him, and where a judgment by 
default has been entered, and within the proper 
time a good defense to the action in which the 
judgment was rendered is made to ap.pear, and 
it be shown that the default was entered through 
excusable neglect or mistake, the default will be 
vacated, and the judgment set aside to permit a 
trial on the merits. It is true that ordinarily the 
setting aside of a judgment by default rests within 
the sound legal discretion of the court, and the 
appellate court will not interfere, but where, as 
in this case, it is made clearly to ap·pear that 
there was such an abuse of discretion, through 
inadvertence or otherwise, as to render the action 
erroneous and unlawful, the appellate court will 
control such discretion, and set aside the illegal 
action. Such discretion does not confer upon the 
court an arbitrary power beyond that of review. 
It is an impartial legal discretion, which cannot 
be employed to the injury of any subject, but 
must be exercised fairly, reasonably, and in ac-
cordance with the established principles of law. 
The power of the court to set aside judgments 
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by default is recognized and conferred in section 
3005, R. S. Utah, and should be liberally exer-
cised, for the purpose of directing proceedings and 
trying causes upon their substantial merits; and 
where the circumstances which led to the default 
are such as to cause the court to hesitate it is. 
' bet~er to resolve the doubt in favor of the appli-
cation, so that a trial may be secured on the 
merits." 
The adjudicated cases and the new Rules clearly 
show that the need for judicial repose must give ·way 
to the overriding policy of the law which is that every 
man is entitled to his day in Court and to a just trial 
on the merits of his cause. 
Defendants in this case, by timely motion, show good 
cause why the judgment below should be set aside. They 
have shown diligence, have filed affidavits of merits and 
tendered an answer which if found true upon a trial of 
the cause would constitute a complete defense to the 
action. They likewise offer to reimburse plaintiffs for 
the costs and expenses which plaintiffs have been put to 
in connection with the default judgment here sought to 
be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
Either on the ground that necessary and indispens-
able parties have not been joined in the action or on the 
ground that the Court below erred in holding Don Barr's 
mistake to be inexcusable or on both grounds, defend-
ants and Jay Larsen respectfully p.ray the Court to 
reverse the orders and rulings of the Court below so 
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that they may have their day in Court at a trial of the 
cause upon the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. M. GILMOUR, 
FRANI~ A. JOHNSON, 
DEY, HOPPAUGH, MARK & 
JOHNSON, 
Attorneys for Defendoots and 
Appellants, 
903 Kearns Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
CLYDE S. JOHNS.ON, 
Attorney for Jay Larsen, 
Appellant and Intervener, 
Vernal, Utah 
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